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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A short note on methodology in economics
Many economists and historians consider the eighteenth century writings of David Humes,
Adam Smith and others as the beginning of economics. In their work the idea gains hold
that individual actions and interactions might yield systematic outcomes even without the
imposition of processes and goals by governments or administrations. This represents a very
early concept of self-organization in economics, that is, the emergence of regularities from a
bottom-up perspective instead of a top-down imposition. This interaction-based approach
stayed the focus of economics until the discipline responded to the Great Depression in
the 1930s by evolving into two increasingly distinct branches, micro- and macroeconomics.
The latter aimed exclusively at analyzing the dynamics and relations of aggregate economic
quantities while the former continued to extend the formalistic framework of interactions of
a very limited number of agents. As the gap between these two disciplines widened, unease
among economists grew. How were micro and macro related, the individual and the aggregate,
the agent and the economy? The answer that dominates economics to this day emerged after
World War II. Economists such as Arrow, Debreu and von Neumann formalized the idea
that rational, fully informed agents who participate in a free exchange can indeed arrive at a
Pareto-efficient equilibrium. And it did not take long for these newly developed tools to be
exploited for the reconciliation of micro- and macroeconomics. The solution came in the
form of the representative agent. Some economist such as Robert E. Lucas even went as far
as postulating that the distinction between micro- and macroeconomics should be abolished
since all economics was essentially based on the preferences and decisions of the individual
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(Hausman 1994). The most widely used models of economic and financial systems have
been based on representative agents ever since.
A second way to look back at this early history of economics is to examine it against
the background of larger scientific and educational1 trends that took place alongside devel-
opments in economic theory. Mirowski (1991), Weintraub (2002) and many others point
out that at the time when the foundations were laid for modern economics in the eighteenth
century, economists looked up to mathematics and physics as prime examples of a “hard
science.” Caldwell (1993) states: “There are a number of reasons why methodology took this
path. Most fundamentally, economics like many of the other social sciences was very eager
to establish its scientific credentials.” In particular, the Newtonian paradigm which at the time
not only seemed to be universally applicable to problems involving force and motion but also
was seen as the constituting physical framework of the universe, was considered by many
economists as the archetype of an ideal science. The struggle and frustration of early failures
to obtain a similarly well structured foundation of economics is described in Mirowski (1991).
The author states that is was only with the influx of scientists ranging from Jevons to Walras,
specifically educated in physics, that the efforts bore fruit. These early economists transfered
the concept of equilibrium from physics to economics and “[...]copied the physical math-
ematics literally term for term and dubbed the result mathematical economics” (Mirowski
(1991), italics in the original).
Before I entered my undergraduate studies in economics, I had spent some years pursuing
a degree in engineering. Unbeknown to me at the time, this put me in the privileged position
to notice these striking parallels myself very early on. I still remember the day in my first
year when I was introduced to the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. I was
1As in every science, the education of scientists formed their future research. A great account of the impact
of university education on early economics is given by Weintraub (2002). In Cambridge, the cradle of many
fundamental discoveries and theories during the early years of economics, graduates had to pass a tedious series
of exams in applied mathematics and physics called Tripos that covered differential equations, optics, conic
sections and other fields. Passing these exams required the fast and error-free applications of a standard set
of mathematical tools to problems that were so far abstracted from reality as to be completely meaningless.
Examples can be found in Weintraub (2002). I took the liberty and showed a few of the example questions
along with characterizations of the Tripos institution to some Master students and PhD candidates in economics.
Without exception, they all noted the similarity to modern day exams in macroeconomics. Following the
path of various eminent economists from the days of their university education throughout their research
career, Weintraub (2002) goes as far to state “The cause of the backwardness of English mathematics was the
backward-looking Tripos examination.”
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struck by it. The arguments and the presentation2 were nearly identical to the exposition of
the first two fundamental theorems of thermodynamics, which I had been taught less than
a year ago!3 As my education in economics progressed, the mechanical, physics-inspired
nature of many economic models became more and more evident. At the same time though,
doubts arose as to whether this “modeling by analogy” was justified and could be reconciled
with everyday observations. In order to shed light on this question, let us first take a look
at a concrete example of how physics arrived at consistent microfoundations. The example
I present here is adapted from Hausman (1994). In a slightly varied form, it can also be
found in Hofstadter (1980). I chose this particular one because it is closely related to that
first analogy between economics and physics that I noted in my undergraduate days.
One of the elementary natural laws in thermodynamics links the main features of an ideal
gas. In particular, the relation between pressure p, volume V and temperature T of an ideal
gas is given by
pV = nRT
where n is the number of moles, and R is a universal constant. While this law, formulated
in the eighteenth century, was confirmed experimentally time and again, physicists were
unsatisfied with the lack of an explanation rooted in the known laws of physics, in particular
Newtonian mechanics. In other words, they looked for plausible microfoundations of the
law. And they succeeded. Under some not too strict simplifying assumptions, the above law
was derived from two ingredients. The first were the well-known Newtonian mechanisms
governing the movement of individual gas particles. The second one was the assumption that
the distribution over the directions of movements of the gas particles is uniform, i.e. each
direction of movement has the same probability. From this model, temperature emerges as
the average energy of the gas particles, and pressure emerges as the average momentum that
is transferred by gas particles bumping into the walls of the containing vessel. Two points
2The rhetorics of economics should not be underestimated, McCloskey (1998).
3 This is not without a certain irony. Despite the superficial similarity, the two are in a way diametrically
opposed. The main message of the fundamental theorems in welfare economics states reassures first year
students that everything will be fine since market efficiency and thus order can be considered the default
outcome. In contrast, the second fundamental theorem in thermodynamics results in dS/dt ≥ 0, that is, bare the
injection of energy, the entropy S will never decrease in a system. To put it in sloppy terms, the natural way of
things is to go from order to disorder.
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about this derivation are worth mentioning. First, it is not completely microfounded since
the distribution of directions only exists on the macro level; a single particle moves only
into one particular direction. Second, temperature and pressure are themselves emergent
properties. An individual particle can be ascribed neither of those. That is, the aggregate
develops qualitatively new properties which are nevertheless rooted in the properties of the
individual constituents.
To sum up, it is the combination of detailed information on mechanisms on the micro-
scopic level, together with statistical assumptions that are relevant for the interaction of
entities on the micro-level, that give rise to emergent regularities on the macroscopic level.
In the words of Hausman (1994): “Yet, it also underscores the connection between the micro
and the macro: no macro state exists unless an appropriate micro state exists.”
It is clear that the most general form of microfoundation in economics, the individual
agent, does not follow this equation. Here, instead of explicitly taking into account the large
number of agents interacting, they are simply assumed away and replaced with one example
of an agent. Hausman (1989) states: “The claim that representative-agent models provide
micro-foundations succeeds only when we steadfastly avoid the fact that representative-agent
models are just as aggregative as old-fashioned Keynesian macroeconometric models. They
do not solve the problem of aggregation; rather they assume that it can be ignored.” It is as if
physicists tried to model the behavior of gas with a representative molecule.
While the majority of models in macro- and financial economics still embraces the
representative agent, a growing number of economists voices concerns over this approach.
Kirman (1992) reviews the pitfalls, shortcomings and inconsistencies of the representative
agent. First of all, usually no trade takes place in representative agent models. This notion
provides the most striking contrast to the complex world of business and finance with its
continuous interactions that surrounds us on a daily basis. Second, any distributional aspects
are excluded a priori in representative agent models. This point, in my view, has become
even more important in recent years due to the perceived and factual widening in the income
and wealth distributions, especially in many developed nations. On a more technical note,
Kirman (1992) continues, it is far from clear whether the actions of the representative agent
are equivalent to the aggregate actions of many agents in each state of the world. Finally,
imposing the sometimes complex aggregate behavior of a collective of entities may yield
highly implausible behavior for the representative agent. Kirman (1992) also points out
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that the long cherished property of most representative agent models, that of unique stable
equilibria, disappears in many agent-based models.
Given these criticisms, it is quite surprising to still see that the majority of macroeconomic
models embraces the representative agent. Rather cynically, Caldwell (1993) points out that
“[...] many economists are indifferent to economic methodology, and most of the rest are
openly hostile to it.” More differentiated, Hausman (1989) discusses the various approaches
that can be taken to evaluating economic research. From an eclectic perspective, put forward
among others by McCloskey (1998), the quality of economic research is primarily determined
by its acceptance by other economists. This viewpoint is certainly mirrored in the incentive
system of academic economics and may thus provide a reasonable explanation of the current
landscape in macroeconomic modeling.
However, a few economists have followed the tradition of transferring models, methods
and formalisms from other sciences into economics. A simple example of such a transfer
from physics is the Ising model. It provides a mathematical description of a system of
many particles that interact locally with their neighbors on a fixed structure such as a lattice.
The model has proven useful in various fields, from quantum physics to the analysis of
crystallization processes and in recent years also as a test bed for random number generators
(Coddington 1996). In economics, adaptations have been developed with varying success4 in
order to account for phenomena such as financial market crashes. The particles in the original
model gain interpretation as market participants, and the bonds between particles represent
the extent to which the participants influence each other’s opinion or sentiment. When agents
synchronize their behavior due to increasing interaction strength past a critical threshold,
the market is increasingly susceptible to sudden changes of sentiment sweeping through the
model. This may then result in sudden, drastic price movements, or crashes. While the model
consists of many interacting agents, analytical results for the model behavior can be obtained,
and the emergent properties can be estimated from data (Sornette et al. 1996; 2001).
Biology has been another source of inspiration for those looking to overcome the in-
adequacy of the standard micro-macro link in economics. In particular models of swarm
formation such as those of Ballerini et al. (2008) and Hemelrijk and Hildenbrandt (2011) can
be seen as examples demonstrating that individual agents with simple heuristics are often
4Chang and Feigenbaum (2006), Brée et al. (2013)
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sufficient to generate complex aggregate behavior. Both papers contribute to the literature of
modeling the dynamics of flocks of birds from the ground up. That is, simple rules for bird
behavior give rise to realistic dynamics of complete flocks. These simple rules are grounded
in the local orientation of the birds, such as the position relative to its nearest neighbors and
its velocity and orientation relative to those neighbors. Ballerini et al. (2008) present the
results of detailed measurement of actual bird behavior in large flocks and contribute thus to a
more accurate microfoundation of these models. This demonstrates the need for high-quality
microlevel data on agent behavior in most agent-based models. Hemelrijk and Hildenbrandt
(2011) extend the models to incorporate more realistic environmental conditions such as
specific movements arising from aerodynamic constraints, and flocking over specific points
on the ground. This highlights the need not only for data on agent behavior, but also for
a detailed knowledge of the environment in which the agents operate. In both papers the
models are no longer tractable, but can easily be analyzed computationally and visually.
Baianu (1986) provide a detailed review of the limits of computational models and
automata for biological models. The authors discuss the core questions of this approach
such as the simplest structures possible needed for biological organisms, and the network
structures of neural and genetic networks. In particular their discussion of fundamental
differences between biological organisms and automatons and its implications on modeling
are highly recommended for any agent-based modeler.
Finally, also in the social sciences, the bottom up approach has received increased
interest in the past years. Traffic jams have been analyzed and simulated with the help of
cellular automata, for example by Nagel and Schreckenberg (1992). Their work underlies the
assumption that all drivers exhibit small imperfections in their behavior, such as tiny delays
in adjusting the speed due to a change in the distance to the leading car. This is sufficient to
generate traffic jams without an obvious obstacle on the road. Instead, jams spontaneously
emerge once the vehicle density on the road exceeds a critical threshold. This work highlights
how small imperfections on the agent level that one might be tempted to abstract from can
give rise to sizable effects on the aggregate. Another illustrative example is provided by
Helbing et al. (2000) who analyze human movement patterns in crowds in order to analyze
past and prevent future mass panics. The strand of the literature they represent constructs
models of human behavior in broad analogy to the models of bird flocks discussed above.
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The approach has since been used to inform planning decisions at large events as well as
architectural design processes.
The inadequacy of the representative agent approach and the potential of transfer from
other disciplines have both received increasing support in the wake of the Global Financial
Crisis that started to unravel in 2007. The self-praise of macroeconomists after years
of celebrating the Great Moderation turned into defensive arguments against the attacks
launched from the general public, politicians and monarchs as to why nobody had seen the
crisis coming. At the same time, funding for and interest in alternative approaches increased.
In the context of the crisis, in particular the stability of the financial system and the connection
between financial system health and economic growth received increased attention. Most
definitions of systemic risk entail the notion that one institution failing may drag others with
it. Yet this part-endangers-whole situation is exactly what cannot be described if the system
is described by a single representative agent. Moreover, the notion of financial contagion
also required the analysis of the topology of the interactions between economic entities.
Mapping the paths between institutions and providing meaningful statistical summaries of
those topologies required the adaptation of network theory to economics. As a consequence,
agent-based modeling and network theory both have gained more and more popularity in
economics.
Agent-based modeling, i.e. the construction of economic or financial systems from
the bottom up, can roughly be divided into two approaches. In what I deem numerical
agent-based modeling, the proportions of a finite number of different strategies or agent
types in an otherwise homogeneous population evolve endogenously based on a fitness
function such as the past success of each strategy. An overview in the context of financial
markets can be found in Hommes (2006). These models do not represent each individual
agent individuals explicitly. Instead, they model the evolution of the proportions in the
population that follow distinct strategies. In contrast, computational agent-based models
employ modern programming techniques and paradigms in order to represent each agent in
the system explicitly. System-level results are obtained by simply letting the agents interact
and then collecting the aggregate statistics, for example by summing up, in close analogy to
how aggregate statistics such as GDP or unemployment are obtained in the real world. A
recent example of a full-scale model of the U.S. private sector can be found in Axtell (2016).
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It should be noted that agent-based modeling has proven helpful in explaining economic
phenomena also outside macro- and financial economics. A prominent example can be found
in Axelrod (1981). The authors evaluated a wide range of strategies for the well-known
prisoner’s dilemma in the context of a tournament. Among other results, their research
showed that cooperative strategies result on average in higher scores than non-cooperative
strategies. This stands in stark contrast to the results taught in most microeconomics courses
that base the result of non-cooperation on the backward induction of rational agents. Their
research is one of the cornerstones of today’s literature of evolutionary game theory. It is
particular interesting in the light of the recent surge of of behavioral economics. While the
picture of human-decision making gets more detailed and richer with every new experimental
study, the above examples show that the aggregate impact of many of these imperfections5
may not easily be deduced from agent-level results.
Network theory in its simplest form amounts to a statistical summary of the – mostly
pairwise – connections between nodes. In our case, these can be economic agents such
as countries, banks, firms or households. However, also individual securities or portfolios
of securities lend themselves to this representation. These pairwise connections may take
various forms. On the country level, the most prominent application is the analysis of the
world trade web as discussed by Squartini et al. (2011a) and Squartini et al. (2011b). In this
case, the links amount to trade relations between countries, and the weight indicates the trade
volume. Between banks and firms, the links may represent credits granted by banks, for
example in the work by Boss et al. (2004). Between firms, they may represent production
chains (Lu and Wang 2008). In the case of securities as nodes, the links may have a less
tangible interpretation such as the correlation between prices. Similarly in the case of security
portfolios, the links may indicate the extent to which two portfolios overlap. The contribution
of network theory in its simplest form can best be explained by comparing it to conventional
statistics. These statistics, such as, for example, the mean of a variable over a population,
allow us to condense in a meaningful way information that is dispersed over the sample. In
contrast to this summary of entity attributes, network theory thus explicitly summarizes the
relations between entities and thus allows to quantify, summarize and analyze interactions
between a large number of agents.
5Imperfections here is to be interpreted as deviations from the standard model of rational decision making.
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While both agent-based models and network theory have appeared in economics indepen-
dent from each other, increasingly research makes use of both techniques simultaneously due
to their complementary nature. In computational agent-based models, one of the unresolved
challenges so far is the at times large number of degrees of freedom in the algorithm design
and the choice of parameters. In order to evaluate the model performance, the resulting
aggregate and agent-level statistics are often compared to their empirical counterparts. Here,
network theory can add value by providing a possibility to evaluate the model performance
also on the meso level. That is, it enables the modeler to judge as to whether the structure
of interactions in the model resembles the structure of interactions in reality, and to use this
information to calibrate or even estimate the model accordingly. These insights can in turn
inform the design of agents’ strategies for choosing interaction partners in future iterations
of model development. In the narrow sense used so far, network theory is rather static. Here,
agent-based modeling can add value by providing richer node behavior. This is in particular
relevant in the social sciences such as economics. As a consequence, agent-based modeling
can bring otherwise static models of economic topologies to life, or increase the space of
possible temporal evolutions of simple dynamic network models.
1.2 Overview
The methodological considerations discussed above have given rise to this thesis. My
contributions are all applications of network theory or agent-based modeling or both to
problems in macroeconomics and financial economics. The focus on financial stability was
due to the fact that when this thesis was started, the economic discipline (and economies
around the world) were still digesting the impact of the Global Financial Crisis. Unless
explicitly mentioned, the contributions presented herein have all been developed by myself.
1.2.1 Stability of Core-Periphery Interbank Networks
In chapter 2 we explore the stability of core-periphery interbank networks in a static sim-
ulation framework. The overnight interbank market virtually disappeared overnight at the
height of the financial crisis in 2007/8. This provoked a surge in interest in the nature and
the functioning of these markets. On the empirical side, a number of papers found that these
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markets are organized around a small number of banks, the “core”, who redistribute liquidity
in the system. We combine this class of networks with a simple simulation framework from
the literature. It is classified as static because banks cannot adapt their behavior to the market
situation by opening new credit lines or other measures. Consequently, the topology of the
network is fixed a priori and does not evolve endogenously. Instead, our simulation takes the
network structure and thus the bilateral credit exposures as given and then evolves the system
in a mechanical way after an initial default of one or several banks. Our work contributes to
the literature in two ways. First, we extend the analysis from an existing model that employs
primarily random networks to a more realistic network topology that is more in line with
empirical findings. On the way, we also examine the implications of the simulation set-up
itself on the simulation outcome. The results exhibit similarities between our model and
the random network baseline, and new aspects that are due to the core-periphery structure.
The dependence of system stability as measured as the number of default banks on the
amount of interbank credit in the system is comparable in the two cases. Both for random
and core-periphery networks, the number of defaults is low for small and large amounts
of interbank assets in the system. For medium values, the number of defaults rises. In the
specific case of core-periphery networks, we show that the extremely low connectivity in the
periphery is a strong contributor to instability. This has no equivalent in the random network
case since there the connectivity is the same across the whole system. We also demonstrate
that the difference between core and periphery banks in our model is only partially due to
the parameterization. Additionally, the particular algorithm that initializes the simulation
contributes to the heterogeneity by allocating assets disproportionately to core banks. This
insight demonstrates the sensitivity of outcomes in agent-based models to even subtle aspects
of model design.
In a second step, we compare the results of the full-scale simulation to an analytical
approximation. This mean-field approach has been successfully demonstrated in the case of
random networks in the literature. It works by modeling the average bank and calculating
its average transactions with its neighbors. When we adapt the method to account for core-
periphery networks, we find that it provides good approximations to the full-scale dynamics
right after the initial default. However, as the simulation unfolds over time, the results of the
approximation differ more and more from the simulation results. This serves as tentative
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evidence that mean-field approximation is less useful for heterogeneous networks such as the
ones that we employ.
1.2.2 Bipartite Clustering in Bank-Firm Networks
Chapter 3 contributes to the empirical literature on real-world economic and financial net-
works. We explore the topology of the Spanish bank-firm credit network over the years
1999-2007. This network has two distinct sets of nodes, banks and firms. Links in the
network always connect nodes of the two sets, never two nodes that belong to the same set.
These types of networks are called bipartite. As mentioned above, statistical descriptions of
empirical networks can, among other things help in the calibration of agent-based macroeco-
nomic models in the future. In particular we analyze the bipartite clustering between banks
and firms with several different statistics. Under bipartite clustering we subsume all network
statistics that are a function of the degree6 distributions of both, banks and firms. The paper
has two intertwined goals. First, we aim at describing the internal linking structure between
banks and firms. In particular we ask whether the bipartite clustering coefficients that we
calculate from the empirical data are random or whether they exhibit significant deviations
from randomness. For this purpose, we compare them with bipartite clustering coefficients
that we obtain from random variations of the empirical networks. These random variations
are generated by keeping all the nodes and their degrees in the original network, but randomly
connecting them. Our comparison finds strong evidence that the bipartite clustering in the
empirical data cannot be explained solely by the degree distributions of banks and firms, but
that it is a particular feature of the data. Our calculations also indicate slight temporal trends
in bipartite clustering over time.
Second, we compare the performance of a range of measures that have been developed to
capture bipartite clustering. Here, the picture that emerges is mixed. While some measures
succeed at identifying the non-randomness of bipartite clustering in the data, other measures
fail to detect this difference. Similarly, the temporal trend can be found in some statistics but
not in others.
6The degree of a node is the number of links that start or end at this node. Precise definitions are provided
in the chapter itself.
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1.2.3 Interactions of Macroprudential and Monetary Policy in Hous-
ing Markets
In chapter 4, we explore the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policy in a simple
agent-based model of the housing market. Housing booms and busts are an integral part of
the economic history of almost all developed nations. Due to financial innovations such as
securitization, housing credit has permeated even more through the financial system in the
run-up to the 2007 crisis in the U.S., increasing its importance for financial stability even
further. Regulatory agencies have responded to this development by crafting policies aimed
in particular at stabilizing the housing market, both in the boom and the bust period. These
measures are part of the recent evolution of so-called macroprudential regulation. Among
the most popular policy measures are caps on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and caps on debt-
service-to-income (DSTI) ratios. In our model, we examine the combined effects of these
measures and monetary policy on the housing market. We show that the impact of monetary
policy on housing market dynamics is smaller than the impact of macroprudential regulation,
thus reinforcing the call for macroprudential regulation. While both maximum LTV ratios
and maximum DSTI ratios are shown to have a significant impact on the market outcome,
the impact of these measures are strongly interdependent. Moreover, their performance
also depends on the state of monetary policy, that is, the interest rate. The main message
from our model is that the effectiveness of individual macroprudential policy measures must
not be evaluated in isolation, but against the full background of monetary policy and other
macroprudential regulations in place.
Chapter 2
Stability of Core-Periphery Interbank
Networks
2.1 Introduction
Interbank markets allow banks to share liquidity risk. Similar to standard models of insurance,
they allow banks to trade the concrete yet a priori unknown realization of a liquidity shock
against the expected value over the whole system. Their importance has been highlighted
by the interbank market freeze in 2008, which lead to unprecedented liquidity injections
by central banks. In the aftermath of the crisis, interbank market structure has come under
increased scrutiny by researchers and policy makers alike. One important strand of research
aims at describing real world interbank markets from a network perspective. Representing
interbank markets as complex networks allows for the use of established tools and statistics
from network theory in order to quantify key characteristics of the topology of real-world
interbank markets. The use of network theory in financial economics is not restricted to
interbank markets. Overviews can be found in Allen and Babus (2008), Jackson et al. (2008)
and Galati and Moessner (2013).
At the same time, research has started to examine the link between interbank market
structure and systemic risk. Systemic risk is here defined as the risk that a shock to an
individual institution propagates through the banking system, leading to an amplification of
the initial losses. In many cases, this question of shock propagation does not lend itself to an
analytical answer. This stands in contrast to other areas of applied network theory such as
epidemiology, where analytical results of dynamic processes on networks can sometimes be
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obtained (Allen et al. 2008). One of the reasons is that interbank networks exhibit nontrivial
shock transmission behavior and heterogeneous nodes. As an example, in the susceptible-
infected-recovered (SIR) model in epidemiology, agents cant take only one of these three
states. If the agent is susceptible and the infection reaches him from one of his neighbors,
he becomes infected. If he is already infected, the renewed infection has no effects. If he
is recovered, depending on the model specification, he may be either immune to renewed
infection, or he may be susceptible again.
In comparison, the question of whether a bank goes default, or “gets infected” due to
a loss, is less trivial to answer. In other words, the transition between the agent states is
not as straightforward as in the above example. Some banks may be resilient to defaults of
one or several of their debtors. This can be due to those debtors only making up a small
part of the loan portfolio, and to sufficiently large capital buffers to accommodate the shock.
For other banks, the defaults of these very same debtors may pose an existential risk due to
a higher portfolio concentration or lower capital buffers. As a consequence of this added
complexity, full-scale simulations of interbank networks are often used in order to analyze
systemic stability.
This paper adds to the literature by examining the stability of core-periphery interbank
networks. These networks are characterized by a small number of densely connected core
banks, and a large number of sparsely connected periphery banks. Originally developed
for the analysis of social networks, the concept has successfully been applied to financial
networks in recent years. Models of core-periphery networks have been shown to provide
a very good description for a variety of interbank market topologies. The most common
interpretation is to see core banks as money center banks, redistributing liquidity in the
banking system. Compared to periphery banks, their health is disproportionally essential for
the unimpaired flow of liquidity through the banking system. This may give rise to moral
hazard since regulators and policy makers might be inclined to bail out core banks that come
under distress.
In a second step, I compare the results of the numerical simulations with an analytical
approximation. This mean-field approach allows to derive approximate results by treating
all core banks and all periphery banks as identical. This reduces not only the computational
costs of making statements about the resilience of a given interbank market. Additionally, it
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enables us to gain further analytical insights into the behavior of the system, and to determine
the key drivers of systemic stability.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature. In section 2.3 we
introduce the network terminology and the core-periphery model. Section 2.4 describes the
simulation set-up and the simulation routine. Section 2.5 presents the simulation results.
Section 2.6 presents the mean-field approach, and section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) mark the cornerstones of the recent surge
in interbank market research. They analyze the role of the network structure in a game
theoretic context with four banks. In both models, banks lend cash among themselves in
order to provide mutual insurance against liquidity shocks, thereby reducing the individual
bank’s need to hold large amounts of liquid assets. Allen and Gale (2000) provide a model
where individual banks are exposed to uncertainty with respect to its customers’ temporal
preferences. The authors show that financial system stability is highest with a fully connected
network, where each bank acts as liquidity insurance for all other banks. In contrast, Freixas
et al. (2000) model the banking system with traveling depositors and thus induce uncertainty
about the location of deposit withdrawal. Customers prefer to withdraw at the destination of
their journey since taking cash with them implies foregone investment returns as opportunity
costs. In their setting, the fully connected banking system is less resilient as opposed to credit
chains. Both papers highlight the two faces of interbank markets. On the one hand they can
provide insurance against individual bank’s liquidity shortage. But on the other hand, they
also serve as potential contagion channels in case of initial financial distress of one bank,
propagating it throughout the system when it would otherwise be contained locally.
The empirical literature on interbank networks has focused on describing different
network characteristics of real-world interbank markets. Often used statistics are the number
of nodes N in the network, the number of links Z in the network, the resulting density
D = ZN(N−1) and a small number of commonly accepted network statistics. The degree
distribution gives the distribution of the number of links that a node participates in. If the
network is directed, that is if each link has a clearly defined start and a clearly defined end, the
in- and out-degree can be distinguished, and correspondingly the in-degree distribution and
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the out-degree distribution. Another common statistic is the average shortest path length. It
gives the mean length of the shortest paths between all pairs of nodes. Clustering coefficients
measure the extent to which the neighbors of a node are connected among themselves. Finally,
assortativity gives the correlation between the degree of a node and the average degree of its
neighbors.
Boss et al. (2004) examine the Austrian interbank market and find scale-free degree
distributions. Furthermore, the interbank market network exhibits low clustering and short
average path lengths. Bech and Atalay (2010) explore the network topology of the federal
funds market and find short average path lengths. Furthermore, they characterize the network
as disassortative, i.e. small banks tend to be linked to large banks and vice versa. Soramäki
et al. (2007) explore the network structure of the fedwire funds service. They too find a
scale-free degree distribution and classify the network as a small-world network. However,
they also find significant clustering in the network, and a structural break coinciding with
the terror attacks in September 2001. Cocco et al. (2009) examine the Portuguese interbank
market and look at the determinants of lending behavior, i.e. relationship lending. They find
that banks make use of established lending relationships in case of larger liquidity needs.
These relationships are usually found between institutions whose liquidity shocks are less
strongly correlated.
Craig and Von Peter (2014) identify core-periphery structures in the German interbank
market. A small proportion of about two percent of all banks forms a core of money center
banks who act as liquidity re-distributors in the system. Craig and Von Peter (2014) also find
that balance sheet characteristics are a good predictor of core membership. Fricke and Lux
(2015) identify a core-periphery structure in the Italian overnight interbank market. In both
markets, the core exhibits little turnover and little variation in size over time. Similar results
are obtained for the Dutch banking system by van Lelyveld et al. (2014), and by Langfield
et al. (2014) for the UK interbank market.
A key problem for researchers trying to link interbank network topology to financial
stability is the lack of available bank-level data on interbank exposures. Apart from very few
exceptions, this data is only available in regulatory institutions. Some researchers have thus
resorted to inferring the bilateral credit exposures from boundary information in the form
of bank balance sheets. Upper and Worms (2004) use individual balance sheet information
for Germany including maturity categories to estimate interbank exposures. They perform
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stability analyses based upon entropy-based estimates of the network structure. In their
model, interbank lending is very closely related to the institutional structure of the banking
landscape with most of the borrowing and lending taking place between banks and their
respective head institutions, such as savings banks and their Landesbanken. Individual bank
failures may in some cases lead to contagion, but widespread waves of defaults do not occur.
Sheldon et al. (1998) also use entropy-based methods to infer the network structure of the
swiss interbank network. Using it as input for stability simulations, they conclude that default
contagion via the interbank market may not be an important source of financial stability risk,
given the small number of defaults that results from direct interbank exposures. Mistrulli
(2011) compare real interbank networks to approximations derived by maximum entropy
methods. They show that entropy-based methods may underestimate the heterogeneity of
real-world networks, resulting in significantly different implications for interbank market
stability.
A second way to deal with the lack of bank level data on bilateral interbank exposures is
to assume that the interbank market topology can be approximated by a well-defined class
of networks.1 Cifuentes et al. (2005) examine the effect of direct contagion and fire sales
in a homogeneous interbank markets structured as random networks. Within their model,
fire sales may lead to widespread defaults while direct contagion is less likely to do so.
Thurner et al. (2003) provide a dynamic model with banks interacting on predefined network
structures. They find that connectivity, free capital and external risk govern the stability of
their system. Nier et al. (2007) provides the benchmark for this paper. The authors develop a
simulation framework with a small number of network and balance sheet parameters. They
use a random network, where a link between any two banks in the system is equally likely.
Their work highlights the non-monotonic relation between network parameters and system
stability. For sparsely connected networks, an increase in connectivity decreases system
stability. However, for denser networks, a further increase in connectivity results in less
defaults.
May and Arinaminpathy (2010) provide a mean-field approximation to the model of
Nier et al. (2007). This analytical approach calculates the average interaction of an average
1Though well-defined has to be taken with caution. For example, so-called scale-free networks are defined
via the degree distribution following a power law. This, however, does not necessarily fix other network statistics
such as assortativity.
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bank with its neighbors. They show that for random networks, the analytical results are
well in line with the full-scale simulation. Moreover, the analytical solutions obtained in
the approximation allow to calculate thresholds in the network parameters where the system
behavior changes significantly. These insights contribute to a better understanding of the
strongly nonlinear relation between network topology and systemic stability.
An overview over the state of counterfactual simulations of interbank markets is given by
Upper (2007). The author finds that while contagion may arise in most models, it does so
only with small probabilities. Whenever it is realized, however, it inflicts significant damage
on the system at hand, driving a large share of institutions into bankruptcy. Given the strong
underlying assumptions in these models as well as the lack of behavioral foundations, the
author concludes that the current generation of these models is less suited for stress testing
and the analysis of policy options.
2.3 Core-Periphery Networks
2.3.1 Networks: Definitions
A network consists of a set {ni} of N nodes, and a set {zi} of Z edges or links between these
nodes. The adjacency matrix AN×N represents links and nodes: entry ai j is equal to the
number of links from node i to node j. In our case ai j ∈ {0;1}, i.e. banks can be connected
by at most one link in each direction. In the weighted adjacency matrix WN×N , the entry wi j
equals the link weight between node i and node j if there is a link between node i and j, and
zero otherwise. In this paper, all networks are directed, that is each link has a clearly defined
start node and end node. As a consequence, neither the adjacency matrix nor the weighted
adjacency matrix are necessarily symmetric. Furthermore, we exclude self loops. These are
links where the starting point and the end point are one and the same node. As a consequence
the elements on the main diagonal of both the adjacency matrix and the weighted adjacency
matrix are zero by definition. In our specific case of interbank networks, a link from bank i
to bank j exists if bank i has lent money to bank j, and the weight on this link equals the
nominal amount of the loan.
The out-degree ziout of a node i is the number of links starting at node i. The in-degree z
i
in
of a node i is the number links ending at node i. In our context, ziout represents the number of
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debtors to bank i, and ziin is the number of creditors to bank i. The total degree of a node is
the sum of in- and out-degree. For each of the three degree types,2 the degree distribution
can be specified over all nodes of the network.3 The density d of a network is the proportion
of possible links that are realized, d = ZN(N−1) .
2.3.2 Core-Periphery Networks
Core-periphery networks are a specialization of more general block networks that were
developed for the analysis of social networks (Wasserman and Faust 1994). The underlying
idea is that the linking behavior of actors (banks, in our case) depends on actor attributes. In
the simplest setting actors are partitioned into distinct classes, depending on the role they take
in the system. The number of distinct classes is smaller than the number of actors, and most
roles are adopted by more than one actor. In a deterministic model, the classes two actors
belong to are sufficient to determine whether these two actors share a link or not (Lorrain
and White 1971). As an example, if we have a network where each actor belongs to exactly
one class A,B or C, we can state for every pair4 of classes whether two actors that belong to
these two classes are connected or not. For example, each actor of class A is connected to
each actor of class B but to none of class C. Two actors whose sets of direct neighbors are
identical are said to be structurally equivalent (White et al. 1976).
Fienberg and Wasserman (1981) and Holland et al. (1983) generalized these models to
pair-dependent stochastic models. Here, the authors introduced stochastic equivalence: all
actors within the same class have the same probabilities for links to actors of all other classes.
In analogy to the above example, now we can make stochastic statements on links between
actors based on their classes. For example, the probability that an actor of class A and an
actor of class B are linked may be pAB = 0.5, and the probability that an actor of class A and
an actor of class C are linked may be pAC = 0.2. For a detailed introduction into stochastic
block models, see Anderson et al. (1992). An extensive analysis of simple stochastic block
models with two classes can be found in Snijders and Nowicki (1997).
2The distinction between in-, out- and total degree exists only for directed networks. For undirected
networks, in-, out- and total degree are identical.
3Or in our case, also over subsets of nodes.
4If the network is directed, for every ordered pair. If the network is undirected, for every unordered pair.
2.4 Simulation set-up and process 20
Core-periphery networks are a further specialization of stochastic block models with only
two classes. In a network of N nodes, we will adopt the notation that the nodes are ordered
such that nodes 1...m belong to the core (C), while the remaining nodes m+1...N belong to
the periphery (P). We denote the class membership of node i as bi ∈ {C,P}. The adjacency
matrices this class of core-periphery networks can then be described stochastically as
A =
(
dcc dcp
dpc dpp
)
. (2.1)
where dbib j denotes the linking probability between nodes i and j.
5 Realizations of
the adjacency matrix are then generated by drawing a random realizations from a uniform
distribution for each element of the adjacency matrix, ui j ∼U(0,1), and ai j is equal to one if
ui j ≤ dbib j and equal to zero otherwise. Core nodes are assumed to be highly interconnected
among each other, while periphery nodes are hardly connected among each other. Thus,
dcc ≈ 1 and dpp ≈ 0. The specification of dcp and dpc differ in the literature. Borgatti and
Everett (2000) postulate the off-diagonal densities dcp = dpc = 1 for the idealized core-
periphery structure. In the application to interbank markets, Craig and Von Peter (2014)
only require that the CP-block be row-regular and the PC-block be column-regular. This
means that each core node must have at least one outgoing link to and at least one incoming
link from a periphery node. Row and column regularity thus translate into the following
constraints:
∑Nj=m+1 ai j ≥ 1 ∀ i = 1, ...,m
∑Nj=m+1 a ji ≥ 1 ∀ i = 1, ...,m.
(2.2)
In this paper, we follow this definition of Craig and Von Peter (2014). A stochastic descrip-
tion of core-periphery networks is thus given by the parameter set {N,m,dcc,dcp,dpc,dpp}.
2.4 Simulation set-up and process
The simulation setup follows very closely the one employed by Nier et al. (2007). There
are two main differences between their approach and ours. First, we employ core-periphery
5Note that this is not equal to the density of the subgraph created by all nodes in bi and b j, which is given
by the average of dbib j and db jbi .
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market topologies while Nier et al. (2007) analyze random networks. Second, we increase
the number of banks by one order of magnitude.
Our interbank markets have N = 200 participating banks. The asset side of each bank’s
balance sheet consists of external assets ei and interbank assets in the form of loans provided
to other banks, ibai. Each bank’s liabilities consist of interbank liabilities ibli, equity eqi and
deposits di. Total external assets in the banking system are denoted by E. The system-wide
proportion of interbank assets IBA to system-wide total assets A is held fixed and denoted as
θ = IBAA . Since E is exogenously determined, and total assets are the sum of interbank assets
and external assets A = IBA+E, the absolute amount of interbank assets is given by
IBA =
θ
1−θ E. (2.3)
Each bank’s equity is a fixed proportion η of its total assets,
eqi = η · (ei+ ibai). (2.4)
The interbank market is created as follows. In a first step, a random realization of the
core-periphery network structure is generated as described in section 2.3, resulting in a fully
specified adjacency matrix. The next step is to determine the link weight, corresponding to
the credit amount on each link. Total interbank assets are then evenly distributed across the
|Z| realized links, yielding the links weight w = IBA|Z| . The link weight together with each
bank’s in- and out-degree determine each bank’s interbank assets and liabilities. After this
step, some banks may end up with more interbank liabilities than interbank assets. Since all
links carry the same weight, this is equivalent to saying that for some banks the in-degree
exceeds the out-degree. The external assets are used to close any existing positive gaps
between interbank liabilities and interbank assets,
ei = max(0, ibli− ibai). (2.5)
The remaining external assets
E˜ = E−
N
∑
i=1
ei (2.6)
are evenly distributed across the banks,
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description parameter default value
total number of banks N 200
number of core banks m 16
number of realizations g 500
shock size s 1
external assets E 800000
net worth η 0.005
proportion interbank assets θ 0.3
density CC block dcc 1
density CP block dcp 0.5
density PC block dpc 0.5
density PP block dpp 0
Table 2.1 Default parameters used in the simulation.
ei := ei+ E˜/N. (2.7)
With the asset side fully specified, each bank’s net worth is then calculated according to
equation 2.4. Finally, deposits are used to ensure the balance sheet identity. Table 2.1 shows
the default values for the model parameters.
For the given parameters, the size of balance sheets is primarily driven by the size of a
bank’s interbank assets and liabilities. Since all links in the network have the same weight,
interbank assets and liabilities are directly proportional to a bank’s out- and indegree. On
average, core banks have higher in- and out-degrees under the default parameters in table
2.1. Core banks have an average in-degree of 107 and an average out-degree of 107, while
periphery banks arrive on average only at 8 outgoing and 8 incoming links. Consequently,
core bank interbank assets and liabilities are on average one order of magnitude larger than
their corresponding periphery counterparts, resulting in a sizable difference between the
average total assets of a core bank and the average total assets of a periphery bank. Our
model setup thus confirms the empirical correlation documented by Craig and Von Peter
(2014) between bank size as measured by total assets, and bank core membership.
The simulation process starts in round 1 with an exogenous shock to a bank i that wipes
out a fraction s of that bank’s external assets. The bank adjusts its liabilities in the following
way. First, the bank’s net worth is used to accommodate the shock. If the size of the shock
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Fig. 2.1 Number of defaults for varying net worth.
exceeds the net worth, ei ·s> eqi, the bank starts defaulting on its interbank liabilities on a pro
rata basis. That is, it transmits a shock of min(w, ei·s−eqi
ziin
) to each of its creditors. If the total
shock to the bank is larger than net worth and interbank liabilities combined, ei ·s > eqi+ ibli,
the deposits absorb the remaining shock.
In round 2 and all subsequent rounds, each bank calculates its decrease in total assets due
to the sum of incoming shocks from its neighbors from the previous round. It then adjusts
its liabilities along the same steps described above. First, equity absorbs the shock. If that
does not suffice, banks default on their interbank liabilities. Once these are depleted, any
remaining shock will be absorbed by deposits. The simulation stops if there are no more
defaults.
2.5 Simulation results
Throughout the simulations, we initially shocked a randomly chosen core bank. We also ran
the simulations with an initially defaulting periphery bank. Since this did not lead to any
significant defaults, it is omitted here.
Figure 2.1 shows the number of defaults for varying values of the net worth η , averaged
over 500 simulations. The overall number of defaulting core banks stays constant up to a
net worth of around 0.6% before decreasing to zero. The time of default, however, changes
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over this range: for low net worth, all core banks go default in round 2. This is due to direct
contagion from the initially defaulting bank and the fact that the core is fully connected
(dcc = 1). For the net worth increasing from 0.3% to 0.6%, the total number of core bank
defaults stays at the maximum, but the time of default gradually changes to later rounds.
Beyond η = 0.7%, no core banks apart from the initial one go default.
Figure 2.1b shows the number of defaulting periphery banks. For a net worth up to 0.7%,
92 periphery banks go default in the first round, i.e. all direct peripheral creditors of the
initially defaulting core bank. This threshold of 0.7% for direct periphery neighbors is higher
than the corresponding threshold of 0.3% for direct core neighbors. The reason is that while
both core and periphery neighbors experience the same shock, core neighbors have, due to
larger total assets, a larger absolute net worth. Consequently, a shock that leads to periphery
bank defaults may not default any core banks. However, a shock that is large enough to
default a core bank is guaranteed to be large enough to default a periphery bank. Round two
periphery defaults occur only for a net worth up to 0.4%. Similar to the behavior of core
banks, the total number of defaults stays constant at 184 over this range while the time of
default gradually shifts to later rounds.
The threshold for the net worth beyond which the system does not exhibit any defaults
is significantly lower than in the similar model by Nier et al. (2007). The primary reason
is that the system analyzed here is far less concentrated. Under the default parameters in
table 2.1, the shock emitted by the initially defaulting core bank is already divided evenly
among an average of 107 counterparties. In contrast, in the small system with 25 banks, even
if the system is fully connected, the initial shock is only divided among 24 counterparties.
Thus, if the proportion between the total shock emitted by the initially defaulting bank and
the average net worth of its direct neighbors stays the same, an increase in the number of
banks tends to stabilize the system.
Figure 2.2 shows the total number of defaults for a varying share θ of interbank assets.
Although the number of simulations per value of θ stays the same, the average number of
defaults becomes slightly more erratic with increasing θ . Up to θ ≈ 0.17, the amount of
interbank assets and the resulting nominal amount of each loan is not sufficient to trigger
any defaults beyond the initially defaulting core bank. The number of core bank defaults
then jumps sharply to the maximum of m = 16, with all defaults occurring in round 2. From
θ ≈ 0.35 on, the number of core bank defaults slowly starts to decrease again and reaches
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Fig. 2.2 Number of defaults for varying share of interbank assets.
1 for θ ≈ 0.6. Before the core defaults decrease to 1, they again shift from round 2 to later
rounds. A similar picture emerges for periphery banks in figure 2.2b. The number of defaults
increases sharply from 0 to 184 already for θ ≈ 0.15 and decreases slowly starting around
θ ≈ 0.45 to an average of 10 for θ = 0.8.
Figure 2.3 shows the simulation results for varying the core size m between 1 and 50. For
a core size up to m≈ 40, the full core defaults. For core sizes above 40, the number of defaults
suddenly collapses, and only the initial bank defaults. Similar to previous simulations, as
we increase the core size, the collapse in the number of defaults is preceded by a shift of
defaults to later rounds. Up to m≈ 25, all core banks default in round 3. For m > 25, core
defaults gradually shift to rounds 4 and 5. Similar to the core bank defaults, the defaults in
the periphery mirror primarily the constraints of the network structure. The slow decrease
in the number of round 2 periphery defaults corresponds directly to the slowly decreasing
number of direct periphery neighbors of the initially defaulting core bank. With the total
number of banks being constant, an increase in the number of core banks is equivalent to a
decrease in the number of periphery banks. Since dPC is constant as well, the average number
of creditors of the initially defaulting core bank decreases with an increasing core size, too.
There are no periphery defaults in later rounds.
The reason for the sudden decrease in core bank defaults is as follows. From the graphics,
we see that (1) no core banks go default in round 2, and (2) all direct periphery neighbors of
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the initially defaulting core bank go default in round 2. In round 1, the initially defaulting
core bank sends out an initial shock. This shock is divided evenly among all direct neighbors
of that bank. Part of it is sent to its core neighbors, and part of it ends up at its peripheral
neighbors. The peripheral neighbors, who are not connected among themselves due to
dpp = 0, buffer a part of the shock with their net worth. They then sent back the minimum of
the remaining shock and their interbank liabilities back to the core.
Thus, in round three the core has received a total shock of
sc(1)−dcp(N−m)
[
¯nwp−min(0, ¯iblp− sc(1)zinc
− ¯nwp)
]
. (2.8)
sc(1) = min( ¯eac− ¯nwc, ¯iblc) is the shock emitted by the initially defaulting bank. Each
of its dcp(N−m) periphery neighbors reduces the shock on average by ¯nwp before sending
it back into the core. The term min(·) captures the fact that periphery banks can emit at most
a shock in size equal to their outstanding interbank liabilities iblp. This shock is larger than
the combined net worth of all core banks, (m−1) ¯nwc, up to a value of m≈ 43, leading to a
complete core default. Beyond this value, the total shock received by the core does no longer
exceed the total core net worth. Remarkably, at no time are there any core defaults in round
2. This corresponds to stating that the shock that is emitted by the initially defaulting bank is
not large enough to threaten other core banks. It is only when the default periphery banks
send the remainder of their round 2 shocks back to the core in round 3 that the remaining
core banks go default.
Figure 2.4 shows the simulation results for varying the density of the CC block of the
adjacency matrix from 0.5 to 1. The number of core bank defaults linearly increases up to
16, representing the average number of direct core neighbors of a core bank. Apart from the
initially defaulting core bank, all core defaults take place in round 3. Only for dcc ≈ 1 does a
small proportion of core defaults shift to round 4. The picture for periphery banks remains
unchanged for all values of dcc: the direct creditors of the initially defaulting core bank go
bust in round 2, and we do not observe any periphery defaults beyond that.
Figure 2.5 shows the results for varying the density of the CP block of the adjacency
matrix. Overall, the total number of core defaults slightly decreases for large values of dcp.
Starting from dcp ≈ 0.5, the number of core defaults comes down from the full core size of
m = 16, reaching 11 for dcp = 1.0. Again, before the overall number of defaults decreases,
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Fig. 2.3 Number of defaults for varying core size.
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Fig. 2.4 Number of defaults for varying CC block density.
2.5 Simulation results 28
(a) defaults, core (b) defaults, periphery
Fig. 2.5 Number of defaults for varying CP block density.
the defaults begin to shift from round 2 to round 3. Later on the defaults shift to rounds 4 and
5, although slower than the transition from round 2 to 3. The slight increase in core stability
can be shown to be a pure balance sheet effect. With an increase in dcp, the average core
bank out-degree increases. Consequently, also average core bank interbank assets and thus
also total assets increase. Since net worth is a function of total assets, the average absolute
net worth of core banks also increases, making them more resilient. At the same time the
initial shock, being only a function of external assets, stays the same.
Round 2 periphery defaults remain constant at 92 for all values of dcp. These are again
the direct periphery neighbors of the initially defaulting core bank. Total periphery defaults
continuously decrease for dcp increasing from 0 to 0.4, and for dcp > 0.4, there are no
periphery defaults beyond the direct creditors of the initially defaulting core bank. The
decrease in later round defaults of periphery banks stems again from the increase in core
stability. This leads core banks to send less and less residual shocks to the periphery with the
increase in dcp.
Figure 2.6 shows the results for varying the density of the PC block of the adjacency
matrix. Except for a small dent around dpc ≈ 0.6, the total number of core defaults stays
constant at m = 16. Core defaults shift from round 2 to round 3 starting from dpc ≈ 0.2,
and for dpc > 0.4 hardly any core defaults occur in round 2 any more. For dpc between
0.5 and 0.6, a few core defaults shift from round 3 to round 4. The picture for periphery
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Fig. 2.6 Number of defaults for varying PC block density.
defaults varies drastically from the corresponding results for dcp. Since dpc directly impacts
the number of shock transmission channels from the initially defaulting core bank to the
periphery, the number of its periphery creditors and thus of the round 2 defaulting periphery
banks increases linearly with dpc. We do not observe any periphery defaults in later rounds.
For the Italian interbank market as represented by the e-MID dataset, Fricke and Lux
(2015) find a pronounced asymmetry between the densities of the two off-diagonal blocks.
The density of the CP block varies between 0.4 and 0.5 while the PC block is far less dense,
with dpc varying between 0.1 and 0.2. For simulation results regarding this asymmetric
structure the reader is referred to Karimi and Raddant (2016) who employ a simulation
algorithm similar to ours on the original e-MID data.
Figure 2.7 shows the simulation results for varying the periphery density. For dpp > 0.3,
we do not observe any defaults at all after round 1. Core bank defaults already disappear at
dpp ≈ 0.25. Shortly before the number of defaults drops to zero, both core and periphery
defaults partially shift from round 3 (core) and round 2 (periphery) to later rounds. In contrast
to the balance sheet argument we gave for the previous graphs, here it is a function of the
transmission. To see this, note that an increase in dpp leads to an increase in the total number
of links and thus a reduction in the link weight. Since the increase in links only concerns
periphery banks, core banks face the same average degree and decreased link weights. This
results in a reduction in interbank assets. In analogy to the argument before, from a balance
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Fig. 2.7 Number of defaults for varying PP block density.
sheet perspective this decreases the absolute net worth of core banks while keeping the initial
shock as a function of the external assets constant. Thus, if at all, from the balance sheet
perspective core banks would have to become increasingly unstable as dpp increases. Clearly,
this is not what we find in the results. What happens instead is that, as the periphery becomes
more and more connected, it is increasingly capable of buffering the shock by itself instead
of sending it back to the core. It is this increased absorption capability by the periphery that
leads to the transition to stability.
2.6 Mean-field approach
Having explored the behavior of the full-scale simulation along the most important parameter
axes, we now examine whether we can approximate those results reasonably well with an
established analytical approach. The mean-field approach is an analytical approximation
to the behavior of the system. It serves two purposes. First, as compared to the full-scale
simulation, it greatly reduces computational costs. Approximations even to large systems
are calculated quickly. This is especially useful in mapping out the parameter space of the
model. Second, by tracing the behavior of the system analytically, we can gain insight into
the main factors that govern the dynamics of the system. The mean-field approach presented
here follows in broad strokes the one May and Arinaminpathy (2010) applied to random
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networks. The authors provided approximations to the model by Nier et al. (2007) and in the
process, gave explanations for the nonlinear behavior observed in the original model. The
main difference to our approach is that from the very beginning, we need to track two types
of nodes, core and periphery banks. In section 2.6.1 we will first discuss the balance sheet
mechanics before comparing the simulation results and the mean-field approximations in
section 2.6.2.
2.6.1 Balance sheet construction
The balance sheets are initialized as described in section 2.4. However, instead of drawing
a realization of the network structure in the first step, and gather bank degrees from that
realization, the mean-field approach takes the average in- and out-degree of core and periphery
banks as a starting point.
The average number of links in the network is given by the sum of the average of the
number of links in each of the four blocks of the adjacency matrix in equation 2.1,
Z = ZCC +ZCP+ZPC +ZPP, (2.9)
where
ZCC = m(m−1)dcc
ZCP = m(N−m)dcp
ZPC = m(N−m)dpc
ZPP = (N−m)(N−m−1)dpp
(2.10)
The size of each individual interbank loan is then calculated as w = IBAZ . The in- and out-
degree of each bank can be split into the number of links to/from core banks, and the number
of links to/from periphery banks. As an example, the average core bank has z¯ccout = dcc(m−1)
outgoing links to other core banks, and z¯cpout = dcp(N−m) outgoing links to periphery banks.
The average in- and out-degrees of core and periphery banks are thus given by
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z¯cin = z¯
cc
in + z¯
pc
in = dcc(m−1)+dpc(N−m)
z¯cout = z¯
cc
out + z¯
cp
out = dcc(m−1)+dcp(N−m)
z¯pin = z¯
cp
in + z¯
pp
in = dcpm+dpp(N−m−1)
z¯pout = z¯
pc
out + z¯
pp
out = dpcm+dpp(N−m−1).
(2.11)
The average degrees, multiplied by the loan size w, give the size of the average interbank
assets and liabilities for core and periphery banks.
The next step in the simulation set-up routine according to section 2.4 was the use of the
external assets to fill any positive gaps between interbank assets and interbank liabilities. The
average size of this gap may be different for core and periphery banks, and consequently core
and periphery banks may receive different amounts of external assets in this step. This has
two implications for the balance sheet proportions. First, if due to the parameterization of the
network structure a large amount of the system-wide external assets is distributed to close
the gap, only a small proportion of the external assets is distributed evenly over the banks.
Consequently, the resulting distribution of external assets between core and periphery banks
may be very skewed. This can contribute to the difference in the average total assets between
core and periphery banks. Because bank net worth is proportional to bank total assets, this
also has direct implications for the resilience of banks.
Second, the simulation algorithm takes as a starting point a shock proportional to the
size of the external assets of the bank. If core banks, due to the network structure, receive a
larger proportion of external assets, the initial shock may be more severe. Even if on average
the in- and out-degree of banks are equal due to dcp = dpc, some banks might have a higher
in-degree than out-degree, and consequently even in this case some of the external assets will
be distributed in this step. Despite working with average bank degrees, it is thus necessary to
look at the degree distributions in order to determine the amount of external assets that is
used, on average, to close the gap.
The actual degree distributions of core and periphery banks can be calculated as follows.
The probabilities for any two links to exist are pairwise independent. The probability of a
core bank to have exactly x outgoing links to periphery banks is thus Bernoulli distributed
P(zcpout = x) = BN−m;dcp(x) =
(
x
N−m
)
dxcp(1−dcp)N−m−x. (2.12)
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Similar, the probability of a core bank to have exactly y outgoing links to other core banks
is given as P(zccout = y) = Bm−1;dcc(y). The probability of a core bank to have an out-degree
of exactly z, P(zcout = z), is then calculated as the sum over the product of the probabilities
for all pairs of x and y that sum up to z. Equation 2.13 shows the resulting formulation of the
in- and out-degree distributions of core and periphery banks.
P(zcin = z) = ∑
z
y=0
[
BN−m;dpc(y) ·Bm−1;dcc(z− y)
]
P(zcout = z) = ∑
z
y=0
[
BN−m;dcp(y) ·Bm−1;dcc(z− y)
]
P(zpin = z) = ∑
z
y=0
[
Bm;dcp(y) ·BN−m−1;dpp(z− y)
]
P(zpout = z) = ∑zy=0
[
Bm;dpc(y) ·BN−m−1;dpp(z− y)
]
.
(2.13)
Since the in- and out-degrees of banks are discrete random variables, the gaps between
in- and out-degree are also random variables. We denote them as
∆zc = zcin− zcout
∆zp = z
p
in− zpout .
(2.14)
If their expected values are larger than zero, the expected amount of external assets needed
to close these gaps is also larger than zero. Banks have at least a degree of 0 and at most a
degree of N−1. Thus, the support for ∆zc and ∆zp is given as {−N+1, ...,1,0,1, ...,N−1}.
The distribution over the gap sizes ∆zc and ∆zp is constructed as follows. The probability for
the difference δ between in- and out-degree is the sum over the joint probabilities that the
in-degree is δ + i and the out-degree is exactly i. The sum is taken over all admissible values
of i, i ∈ {0, ...,N−δ −1} so that the in-degree runs from 0 to the maximum possible degree
N−1:
pc∆(δ ) = P(∆
z
c = δ ) = ∑
N−δ−1
i=0 [P(z
c
in = δ + i)P(z
c
out = i)]
pp∆(δ ) = P(∆
z
p = δ ) = ∑
N−δ−1
i=0
[
P(zpin = δ + i)P(z
p
out = i)
] (2.15)
The gap between interbank assets and liabilities is obtained by multiplying the degree
difference with the link weight,
∆c = w ·∆zc
∆p = w ·∆zp.
(2.16)
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We are now interested in the expected values of these gaps, provided that they are positive.
These can be calculated multiplying the probability p0∆zc/p
that the gap is positive in the first
place with the expected value over the positive gap size:
e˜c,gapi = E[max(0,∆c)] = w · p0∆zc ·∑
N−1
i=0
[
i · pc∆(i)
]
e˜p,gapi = E[max(0,∆p)] = w · p0∆zp ·∑
N−1
i=0
[
i · pp∆(i)
] (2.17)
where
p0∆zc = P(∆
z
c > 0) = ∑
N−1
δ=1 p
c
∆(δ )
p0∆zp = P(∆
z
p > 0) = ∑
N−1
δ=1 p
p
∆(δ ).
(2.18)
Equations 2.17 give us the expected amount of external assets that each core and periphery
bank requires to fill the gap. In general, these values are nonzero even if on average, in- and
out-degree are equal for all banks. We call the effect of an uneven distribution of external
assets between core and periphery banks due to this filling up the “balance sheet effect” for
short. Three important insights arise from this calculation. First, the gap is linearly increasing
in p0∆zc/p
, i.e. in the probability that the gap is larger than zero in the first place. For example,
if dpc > dcp, the expected in-degree of core banks is larger than the expected out-degree.
This increases the probability that core banks on average have more interbank liabilities than
interbank assets, and thus pc∆0 is larger than compared to the case where dpc < dcp.
Second, the gap is also linearly increasing in the link weight w. If interbank assets are
larger as a result of increasing θ , for the same network specification, the gaps will on average
be wider. In both cases, a larger proportion of external assets is used for filling up the gaps,
leaving a smaller proportion of external assets to be distributed evenly across all banks.
Finally, with a typical parametrization of m << N, dcc ≈ 1 and dpp ≈ 0, not only do core
banks have on average a higher degree than periphery banks. But the core bank distributions
are also wider than their periphery counterparts. This larger variance also increases the gap
disproportionally for core banks, ∆c > ∆p. As a consequence, core banks will on average
receive more external assets than periphery banks.
From the default parameter values given in table 2.1, dcp = dpc = 0.5. If we ignored the
balance sheet effect, this would imply that neither core nor periphery banks have an expected
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gap, e˜ci = e˜
p
i = 0. Thus, the external assets are distributed evenly across core and periphery
banks, eci = e
p
i =E/N. However if we account for the fact that realized bank degrees may give
rise to banks that have a positive gap, e˜c,gapi > 0 and e˜
p,gap
i > 0 are determined by equation
2.17. The remaining external assets are then given as E˜gap = E−m · e˜c,gapi − (N−m) · e˜p,gapi ,
resulting in
ec,gapi = e˜
c,gap
i + E˜
gap/N
ep,gapi = e˜
p,gap
i + E˜
gap/N
(2.19)
Figure 2.8 demonstrates the balance sheet effect for changing the share of interbank
assets and thus also the link weights w. It shows for core and periphery banks the ratio of
external assets per bank if we neglect the balance sheet effect, and if we take the expected
gap into account, ec,gapi /e
c
i and e
p,gap
i /e
p
i . If the balance sheet effect did not play a role,
these ratios would be constant at 1. As expected, we see that the balance sheet effect assigns
disproportionally more external assets to core banks. They receive more external assets for
filling the gap even for small values of θ . As the share of interbank assets becomes larger,
the total amount of external assets assigned to core banks increases up to 30% above the
non-adjusted value of 4000 while it falls below this level for periphery banks. The balance
sheet effect creates ripple effects throughout the simulation. As discussed, this effect will
directly affect the initial shock size. Furthermore, since the balance sheet effect impacts
the size of total assets, it also widens the gap between total core and periphery bank net
worth. Concluding, we can state that the particular algorithm used to initialize the balance
sheets induces systematic asymmetries in the distribution of external assets between core and
periphery banks. Under default parameters, this leads to core banks being assigned a larger
share of the interbank assets.
2.6.2 Calculation of defaults
Motivated by the results of the full-scale simulation, we demonstrate the mean field approach
only for initially shocked core banks. The initial shock to one of the core banks is given as
the product of shock proportion s and the bank’s external assets eac,
S(1) = s · ¯eac. (2.20)
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Fig. 2.8 Illustration of the balance sheet effect
The bank defaults if the shock exceeds its net worth, S(1)> ¯nwc. In that case, each of its
creditors receives a shock of size
S(2) =
min( ¯iblc,S(1)− ¯nwc)
z¯cin
. (2.21)
The conditions for round 2 defaults are
S(2) > ¯nwc
S(2) > ¯nwp
(2.22)
On average, core banks have larger total assets and thus also a larger net worth than
periphery banks, ¯nwc > ¯nwp. Thus, second round core bank defaults occur only if their
counterparts in the periphery also fail. The newly default periphery banks emit to each of
their creditors a shock of size
Sp(3) =
max
(
0,min( ¯iblp,S(2)− ¯nwp)
)
z¯pin
, (2.23)
and the newly default core banks emit to each of their creditors a shock of size
Sc(3) =
max
(
0,min( ¯iblc,S(2)− ¯nwc)
)
z¯cin
. (2.24)
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The max(.) indicates that the shock may be zero if the banks do not go default. In words,
if the banks have a sufficient buffer of net worth, they do not transmit any shock. Should
the shock exceed the net worth, they emit a shock that is at most as large as their interbank
liabilities. Until now, the simulation is exact within the mean field approximation. This is
due to the fact that each bank received at most one shock. From here on, banks may receive
multiple shocks from different debtors. These aggregate shocks are linear combinations of
the shocks emitted by default core and periphery banks. In round 3, they are given as
Sinc (3) = S
in
cc(3)+S
in
cp(3) = n
S
cc(3) ·Sc(3)+nScp(3) ·Sp(3)
Sinp (3) = S
in
pc(3)+S
in
pp(3) = n
S
pc(3) ·Sc(3)+nSpp(3) ·Sp(3).
(2.25)
The superscript in denotes incoming shocks as supposed to the outgoing shocks that we
have explored so far. The factor nScc(3) denotes the number of shocks a core bank receives
from other core banks in round 3. Similarly, nScp(3) denotes the number of shocks it receives
from periphery banks in round 3, and so on. These factors of shocks follow a binomial
distribution similar to those discussed in equation 2.13:
P
(
nScc(3) = x
)
= Bzccin ;dcc (x)
P
(
nScp(3) = x
)
= Bzcpout ;dcp (x)
P
(
nSpc(3) = x
)
= Bzpcin ;dpc (x)
P
(
nSpp(3) = x
)
= Bzppout ;dpp (x)
(2.26)
For our calculations, we take advantage of the fact that, in general, Sc(3) and Sp(3) are not
multiples of each other. Thus, each aggregate shock Sinc (3) and S
in
c (3) has only one possible
decomposition in contributions from the core and from the periphery. Since the number
of shocks that a bank receives from the core is independent from the number of shocks it
receives from the periphery, the probabilities for the occurrence of shock combinations can
be calculated as the product of the probabilities of its two components:
P
(
Sinc (3) = x
)
= P
(
Sincc(3) = xc∧Sincp(3) = xp
)
= Bzccin ;dcc (xc) ·Bzcpout ;dcp (xp)
P
(
Sinp (3) = x
)
= P
(
Sinpc(3) = xc∧Sinpp(3) = xp
)
= Bzpcin ;dpc (xc) ·Bzppout ;dpp (xp)
(2.27)
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Core banks in round 3 go default if the incoming shock exceeds their net worth. This
corresponds to the cumulative probability P
(
Sinc (3)> n¯wc
)
which can be calculated by
enumerating the combinations of shocks in equation 2.25 that fulfill this condition. The
expected number of newly default core banks in round 3, n¯de fc (3), is then given by multiplying
this probability with the number of nondefault core banks at the beginning of round 3,
(m−1− z¯ccin ) :
n¯de fc (3) = P
(
Sinc (3)> n¯wc
) · (m−1− z¯ccin ) (2.28)
At the end of the third round, banks have been subject to the distribution of aggregate
shocks according to equations 2.25 and 2.27. Consequently, even if all core banks and
periphery banks had initially been identical as assumed in this the mean field approach, in
round 3 they evolve into a heterogeneous field of banks due to the different linear com-
binations of shocks they receive. Some banks fail while others, who received a different
shock combination, are still healthy. Moreover, all we can say about the banks that have not
yet failed is that the combination of shocks they received was not enough to deplete their
net worth. However, these banks have most likely different levels of net worth left, again
due to the different combinations of shocks they experienced. Thus in order to maintain an
accurate picture of the state of the system, it would now be necessary to calculate the resulting
distribution of remaining net worth among the nondefault banks, and the distribution of
outgoing shocks from the newly default banks. This would, however, result in the individual
tracking of each individual bank and thus a return to the full-scale simulation. We avoid this
by just distinguishing between newly default banks and nondefault banks, and taking the
average of each of these groups. We calculate the mean remaining net worth for nondefault
core and periphery banks, and the mean size of outgoing shocks for the newly default core
and periphery banks.6 We can then compute the next round by working only with one size
of shocks, and one size of remaining net worth, and avoid falling back into the full-scale
simulation. As a result, at the end of round 3 we have the number of default and nondefault
core and periphery banks, their average net worth, average remaining interbank liabilities
6To be even more precise: the weighted average of (i) the average outgoing shock size of newly default core
banks and (ii) average outgoing shock size of the already default core banks. In this static setting, they can, in
higher rounds, still transmit shocks although they are already default.
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and average outgoing shock size. These inputs allow us to repeat the same algorithm for
higher rounds.
2.6.3 Results
We now compare the mean field approximation with the full-scale simulations. Figure 2.9
shows the results for varying net worth, and 2.10 shows the results for varying the share
of interbank assets. The mean-field approach results in a very good approximation of the
full-scale simulation during the first three rounds. In round 2, the mean-field approximation
exhibits step-wise transitions as opposed to the smooth change of the number of defaults in
the full-scale simulation. This is due to the binary nature in mean field approach as shown in
equation 2.22. Since we calculate block-wise averages, either all direct neighbors in a block
fail, or none. Since the increase in round 3 core defaults for increasing net worth is directly
related to the decrease in round 2 core defaults, this increase is step-wise as well. A similarly
abrupt transition can be observed in round 2 periphery defaults in figure 2.10b.
For round 3 periphery defaults, figure 2.9b shows that the mean-field approach is capable
of reproducing the smooth decline in the number of defaults that is observed in the full-scale
simulation. This can be understood in the light of the previous derivations. In round 1 and
2, each bank receives at most one shock, and the number of defaults is governed by the
average degrees. From round 3 on, this is replaced by the probabilistic approach culminating
in equation 2.28 which allows for a more gradual transition in the number of defaults, also
along parameters that do not impact the average degrees.
This comes at a cost, however, as the figures show. For rounds 4 and 5, the mean-field
approximation cannot reproduce the behavior of the simulation accurately over the full
parameter range. In figure 2.9b, round 4 periphery defaults registered only for very small
values of η , and round 5 defaults are not produced at all by the mean field approach. For
both varying η and varying θ , the mean field simulation of round 4 defaults breaks down as
soon as the total number of defaults in each block is no longer maximal.
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(a) defaults, core (b) defaults, periphery
Fig. 2.9 Comparison of mean field approximation (solid lines) and full-
scale simulation (dotted lines) for varying net worth.
(a) defaults, core (b) defaults, periphery
Fig. 2.10 Comparison of mean field approximation (solid lines) and full-
scale simulation (dotted lines) for varying share of interbank assets.
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2.7 Conclusions
This paper extended the model of Nier et al. (2007) to core-periphery networks. The simula-
tion results can be summarized as follows. Increasing bank’s net worth has, unsurprisingly, a
clear stabilizing effect. However, this stabilization happens at far lower levels of net worth
than in the model by Nier et al. (2007). This is due to the fact that, in contrast to the original
paper with 25 banks, our system is much more distributed with 200 banks. Consequently, the
impact of a single bank decreases. The original shock equal to one bank’s external assets
would, if external assets were evenly distributed, be equal to E/N and thus decreasing in the
number of banks in the system.
For very small amounts of interbank assets, the system tends to be stable. The number of
defaults then jumps abruptly to a plateau for the share of interbank assets surpassing 0.15
before slowly decreasing again for the share of interbank assets exceeding 0.35 (core banks)
and 0.45 (periphery banks).
The most interesting result comes from the periphery density. Even slightly increasing
this parameter allows the periphery banks to act as a better buffer by resolving shocks among
themselves instead of reflecting them nearly completely back into the core. This raises the
question whether a pronounced core-periphery structure is optimal from a financial stability
perspective.
In a second step, we examined whether the mean field approach May and Arinaminpathy
(2010) applied to random networks can be applied to core-periphery networks as well. Before
running the simulations, we examined the effect of the simulation initialization algorithm
on bank balance sheets. We found that already the particular way the simulation is set up
can increase the differences between core and periphery bank balance sheets significantly.
Differences in balance sheet sizes between these two groups have thus two determining
factors.
Calculating the shock propagation in the mean-field approximation, we found that de-
faults in the first three rounds are approximated very well. Round 2 defaults evolve step-wise,
while round 3 defaults already allow the approximation to replicate the continuous develop-
ment of the number of defaults. For higher-round defaults, banks become more and more
heterogeneous since they experience different linear combinations of incoming shocks. In
order to avoid falling back into the full-scale simulation, it becomes necessary to average over
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banks at the end of each round. This averaging out leads to the mean-field approximation
becoming less accurate, demonstrating the limits of this approach. For processes that last
several rounds and nontrivial node transmission behavior, it quickly loses accuracy. This
raises the question whether the mean-field approach can be modified or extended in order to
arrive at a better approximation to the full-scale simulation.
Chapter 3
Bipartite Clustering in Bank-Firm
Networks
3.1 Introduction
Credit is an integral part of modern economies. The provision of credit by banks to the real
economy and its importance for economic dynamics have been come under increased scrutiny
after the Global Financial Crisis. Duchin et al. (2010) provide evidence of the decline in
real investment following constraints on financing. The authors demonstrate in particular
the long-lasting effect of these constraints on real investment and growth. Campello et al.
(2010) present survey-based empirical evidence of financial constraints severely limiting
investment in technology, employment and capital. Furthermore, the authors show that firms
who face constraints tend to draw on outstanding credit lines faster than firms who currently
do not face financing constraints. In particular this last point emphasizes the interactions that
may emerge between credit providers and firms. It shows that ignoring the structure of these
interactions between firms and banks yields an incomplete picture. We can demonstrate this
in a toy example.
Imagine an individual bank getting into distress and subsequently reducing its credit lines
to its debtors. The consequences for real economic performance are likely to depend on
the number of debtors, their economic importance, and their alternative, already existing
credit lines. If these debtors are dependent on that single bank and do not have established
connections to other banks, they may experience financial difficulties that in turn impact their
economic performance. Alternatively, these debtors may all have an alternative bank to turn
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to. However, for reasons such as sector-specific lending or others, they may all turn to the
same bank which suddenly faces credit requests by a large number of firms, and it may not
be in the position to satisfy them all. If our debtor firms all turn to different banks, the shock
is more dispersed and may be buffered better by the whole banking system.
A similar argument can be made from the opposite viewpoint. The impact of a company
defaulting on its credit depends on the structure of its neighborhood. The first point to
consider is whether the impact of this default is concentrated on one bank, or whether it
is spread on several banks. In both cases, the next question is the relative importance of
that one debtor for its creditors. If it was one of a few important debtors, it may well have
consequences for subsequent bank lending behavior. In the case of several creditors, we can
make an argument similar to the one presented above. If all these banks adapt their credit
policy in response to the default, and if they happen to lend to the same companies, the initial
default may be reflected back onto those firms, suddenly making it more difficult for them to
get credit from all of their creditors.
These rudimentary scenarios contain a lot of “ifs,” and nearly all of these refer to the
structure of the credit network between banks and firms. We did not know about the
relative importance of the distressed institution for its credit counterparty, and also not about
second order connections, that is further counterparties of that initial counterparty. Detailed
knowledge of this linking structure is thus important for gaining insights into potential
endogenous dynamics due to credit events.
Of course, this argument is not restricted to the possibility of an event as drastic as a
default. Changes in revenue, profitability or other factors may all play a role in changing
a bank’s credit policy towards particular debtors. Similarly, these firm factors may also
influence the firm’s decisions on their borrowing strategy. Farinha and Santos (2002) confirm
this in an empirical study on bank and firm lending in Portugal.
From a methodological viewpoint, this argument stands in broad analogy to the one
brought forward by Acemoglu et al. (2012). Here, the authors explore the interaction effects
between different sectors of the economy via input-output relations. They go then on to
provide a model demonstrating that idiosyncratic shocks to individual sectors may give rise
to aggregate fluctuations in output, depending on the network structure.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing an empirical analysis of the bank-firm
credit network of the Spanish economy. This network contains two distinct classes of nodes –
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banks and firms – , and credit connects nodes from the two sets, never nodes in the same set.
It can thus be considered as a bipartite network. From an economic perspective, that means
we have data only on real sector credit provision and no information on interbank credit. We
subsume all network statistics that are a function of both bank and firm degrees and thus at
least partially capture an aspect of this internal linking structure under “bipartite clustering.”
This is done in analogy to clustering in unipartite networks, a popular set of network-based
statistics for the analysis of unimodal graphs.
The development of statistics for bipartite graphs is still subject to ongoing research. New
statistics are still proposed in the literature to measure particular aspects of bipartite graphs,
and there is so far no broad consensus on a set of standard measures for the description of
bipartite networks. As a consequence, this paper has two intertwined goals. The first one is
the analysis of the Spanish bank-firm networks. This entails the description of the empirical
data with a variety of bipartite clustering statistics in section 3.2. In order to determine
whether these statistics can be considered random or not, in section 3.3 we compare them to
their counterparts that have been calculated from random networks. The results provide a
basis for future research on the evolution of bank-firm credit network topologies.
As a secondary goal, we evaluate the performance of the measures that we employ. This
is only possible since we employ various different measures. If one or several measures
indicate the existence of trends in the empirical data or nonrandom features in comparison to
the simulated networks while another measure does not indicate any differences, this may
be seen as evidence against the suitability of that particular measure for the analysis of the
networks at hand. While this analysis provides by no means a final answer to the quest for
the best bipartite network statistics, it does provide a basis for further discussion.
In section 3.2 we provide a short discussion on methodology and present the empirical
data. We analyze the bipartite networks directly and also present summary statistics for their
projection networks. Section 3.3 then compares the results from the empirical analysis with
results obtained from randomly generated counterparts of the empirical data. We conclude
by discussing the potential implications for financial stability in section 3.4.
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3.2 Bipartite clustering in the Spanish bank-firm network
3.2.1 Methodology and data
A bipartite network is defined by G = {T,B,E} where T is a set of top nodes, B is a set
of bottom nodes, and E is a set of links. These links can only be observed between nodes
of different sets, not between two nodes of the same set. Many real-world systems exhibit
this dichotomy and can thus be modeled as bipartite graphs. Popular examples of large
bipartite graphs that have been analyzed in the academic literature are actor-movie networks
as discussed in Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Newman et al. (2001), and scientist-publication
networks as analyzed in Newman (2001a), Newman (2001b) and Newman (2001c). In the
economic sphere, networks of corporate boards and directors have received attention by
Battiston and Catanzaro (2004), Conyon and Muldoon (2004) and Robins and Alexander
(2004), among others.
While there seems to exist an emerging minimal consensus for relevant statistics on
unipartite networks (Newman 2003), the analysis of bipartite networks is still subject to
ongoing research. In some cases, researchers overcome this problem by developing tools
ad-hoc, for the network at hand. This often impedes the comparison of different networks
analyzed by different researchers. Latapy et al. (2008) provide a survey over some of these
statistics. Borgatti and Everett (1997) provide an extensive discussion of bipartite network
statistics in the context of social network analysis. Among others, the authors present
algorithms for cluster detection and centrality measures.
Given the lack of consensus, we employ several different measures of bipartite clustering
in this study. This is beneficial for two reasons. As regards the insights into the particular
networks at hands, different measures may pick up different aspects of the data. The picture
that emerges is thus likely to be richer and more detailed than if we employed only a single
measure. From the methodological perspective, this analysis also contributes to the ongoing
debate about the suitability of each measure for capturing bipartite clustering.
One way to circumvent the challenges that come with the direct analysis of bipartite
graphs is their transformation to unipartite graphs. These can then be analyzed with the
established tools of unipartite network theory. This transformation usually is done via one-
mode projections, where each bipartite graph gives rise to two projected unipartite graphs. In
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one projection graph, the top projection, the set of top nodes is kept, and two top nodes are
connected in the unipartite projection graph if they share at least one bottom neighbor in the
bipartite graph. In the other projection graph, the bottom projection, the set of bottom nodes
is kept, and two bottom nodes are connected in the unipartite projection graph if they share at
least one top neighbor in the bipartite graph. An alternative way of describing the links in the
projection graph is to say that two nodes are connected in the projection if the shortest path
between them in the bipartite graph has a length of 2. If A is the |T |× |B| adjacency matrix
of the bipartite network, the weighted adjacency matrix of the top projection, Pt , and of the
bottom projection, Pb, are obtained as
P t|T |×|T | = A ·AT
Pb|B|×|B| = A
T ·A (3.1)
where the superscript T denotes the transpose. The weight of each link in the projections
corresponds to the number of common bottom (top) neighbors. The adjacency matrices of
the unweighted projections Pu,t and Pu,b can then be obtained as
pu,ti j = min(p
t
i j,1), i, j = 1, .., |T |
pu,bi j = min(p
b
i j,1), i, j = 1, .., |B|.
(3.2)
Working with projections of bipartite networks, however, comes with its own challenges.
First, there is a loss of information, in particular for unweighted projections. The reason is
that the projection is not a bijective function.1 That is, for a given projection there are multiple
bipartite graphs that may have given rise to it. The problem of reconstructing bipartite graphs
from projections and possible solutions are discussed by Guillaume and Latapy (2004). Du
et al. (2008) explore the problem of information loss in the context of biclique detection. A
more general discussion is given in Everett and Borgatti (2013). Here, the authors conclude
that in many cases the simultaneous use of both projections is fully sufficient to recover the
most important network characteristics, a position that is also maintained by Breiger (1974).
For the special case of team identification or network partitioning, Guimerà et al. (2007)
show that if weighted projections are used, the loss of information that arises from using only
one projection is negligible.
1A one-to-one mapping between the two sets.
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A second point to consider when working with projections is that the resulting networks
are usually very dense. This is of no concern when dealing with benchmark networks in the
social networks literature, which only have a few dozen nodes. When working with very
large networks, however, this may significantly increase the computational costs of storing,
analyzing and modifying the projections.
Finally, the projections may exhibit properties which are not due to particular charac-
teristics in the bipartite graph but due to the application of the projection itself. The most
prominent example is clustering. For unipartite random networks, global clustering as defined
in equation 3.3 is usually close to zero. However, as Newman et al. (2001), Guillaume and
Latapy (2004) and Guillaume and Latapy (2006) show, in unipartite networks arising from
projection, global clustering is significantly different from zero.
The data in this study comes for the Bank of Spain Credit Register. It contains direct
exposures of banks to firms. Banks are required to report exposures larger than 6’000 EUR.
The data was made available in the form of anonymized adjacency matrices for the years
1999-2007. That is, for each year y we have a |T y| × |By| adjacency matrix with entries
ayi j ∈ {0,1}. We thus know only whether there is a loan from bank i to bank j, but not
the amount. Furthermore, we do not have consistent bank or firm identification numbers,
so we cannot track the individual banks and firms over time. In our case, the links are
directed: credit relationships have a clearly defined borrower and a clearly defined lender.
However, since all borrowers (firms) constitute the bottom set of nodes, and all lenders
(banks) constitute the top set of nodes, the directed links all have the same direction. We can
thus treat the network as undirected.
Table 3.1 gives an overview over the empirical data. The number of top nodes (banks),
nt = |T | is declining continuously over the course of the sample. While in 1999 there where
227 banks in the sample, this number shrinks by more than 10% to 193 banks in 2007.
The change in the number of bottom nodes (firms) is even more remarkable. It more than
quadruples from nearly 50’000 firms in 1999 to more than 200’000 firms in 2007. This
increase is accompanied by an increase in the number of bilateral credit connections. It
rises from around 100’000 in 1999 to more than 300’000 in 2007. The resulting density of
the network, defined as D = zntnb , stays almost constant and well below 1% over the whole
sample period. The largest connected component, LCC, is defined as the largest connected
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subgraph of the original network. Given the low network density, it is surprisingly large over
the whole sample period. At each point in time, it contains nearly all nodes.
Given the only moderate increase in the number of banks, the increase in the number of
links is reflected in a sizable shift in the degree distribution of banks. This is evident from
the increase in the mean, median and maximum degree db. The degree distribution of banks
is highly skewed, as indicated by the difference between mean degree and median degree.
While the median degree increases from 40 to 133 over the sample period, the mean degree
increases from 478 to 1771.
In contrast to banks, firms are far less connected. On average firms only have a degree d f
of around two. This average is slightly decreasing over the sample period. The maximum
degree of 10 is three orders of magnitudes smaller than the maximum degree of banks. While
the total number of links increases, the average number of links per firm actually decreases
slightly over the sample. The increase in the number of links is accounted for by the strong
increase in the number of firms. These results are in line with previous empirical work for
the Japanese bank-firm network (De Masi and Gallegati 2012) and for the Italian bank-firm
network (De Masi et al. 2011).
The shortest average path length S reported here is the average over all bank-bank pairs
in the largest connected component. On average, it takes less than four steps (i.e. bank-firm-
bank-firm-bank) from one bank to any other bank. This average distance becomes slightly
shorter over the sample period.
Figure 3.1 sheds more light on the degree distributions of banks and firms. It shows the
empirical cumulative degree distributions for banks and firms for each year in the sample.
Figure 3.1a shows that bank degrees seem to follow a scale-free distribution over a wide
range of the support. The distribution shifts slightly to the right over the course of the sample
period, indicating the overall increase in connectivity. The distributions for 1999-2001 are
nearly identical, and also the distributions for the years 2002-2004 and 2005-2007 each are
very similar. For firms, this grouping is difficult to confirm since the support of the degree
distribution is very small. The proportion of firms with a degree of five or less is steadily
increasing over time.
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
nt 227 216 218 214 213 209 189 195 193
nb 54049 60007 61428 98288 108520 119506 183738 206453 202691
z 108610 117249 120698 177636 196045 212122 314574 349651 341899
D 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009
LCC 54261 60219 61642 98496 108731 119711 183925 206640 202875
LCCt 221 214 216 212 212 207 188 191 189
LCCb 54040 60005 61426 98284 108519 119504 183737 206449 202686
S 3.80 3.82 3.79 3.72 3.70 3.70 3.66 3.64 3.63
min(db) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
med(db) 40 41 43 61 65 80 117 124 133
mean(db) 478.46 542.82 553.66 830.07 920.40 1014.9 1664.4 1793.0 1771.5
max(db) 17711 19039 19497 27249 29673 31589 43486 48542 47075
min(d f ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
med(d f ) 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
mean(d f ) 2.01 1.95 1.96 1.81 1.81 1.77 1.71 1.69 1.69
max(d f ) 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8
CC4 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.44 0.46 0.47
Table 3.1 Summary statistics for the empirical bigraphs. For each year, the
table shows the number of banks nt ; the number of firms nb; the number of
links z; the network density D; the size of the largest connected component
for the total network (LCC) as well as for banks (LCCt) and firms (LCCb);
the average shortest path length S; minimum, mean, median and maximum
degree for banks (db) and firms (d f ); and the global clustering coefficient
CC4.
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(a) ecdf banks. (b) ecdf firms.
Fig. 3.1 Empirical cumulative distribution function (ecdf) of (a) bank
degrees and (b) firm degrees.
3.2.2 Bipartite clustering
The second set of statistics, comprising the main focus of this paper, have been designed
specifically for bipartite networks. By definition, nodes in bipartite graphs form links only
with nodes from the other set. In order to shed light on the structure of the connectivity
between nodes of the same set, Latapy et al. (2008) recommend to include the analysis of the
2-degree, d2. It is defined as the number of unique neighbors of a node’s neighbors. In the
context of our dataset, the 2-degree of a bank is the number of banks with whom it shares at
least one direct credit exposure.
Latapy et al. (2008) point out that the 2-degree alone contains only limited information.
A large 2-degree can either be driven by a large 1-degree of the original node, or by large
non-overlapping neighborhoods of the node’s neighbors. The two extreme cases can be
described as follows. In the first case, the original node i is only connected to one node j of
the other set, and that one node has degree d1( j) = d2(i)+1 where d2(i) denotes the 2-degree
of node i. In the second case, the original node i has d1(i) = d2(i) neighbors. Each of these
neighbors has a degree of two, and the intersection of any two neighborhoods consists only
of node i. In other words, a large 2-degree of node i could be driven either by node i having
many direct neighbors who in turn have a low degree, or by node i having few but highly
connected neighbors. The authors thus recommend to examine the correlation of the degree
and the 2-degree.
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For banks, figure 3.2 presents the ratio of 1-degree and 2-degree (“degree ratio”). The
first case described above would result to a degree ratio that approaches zero as the 1-degree
becomes arbitrarily large. For the second case, this ratio approaches one. Given that firms
have an average degree of around 2, we expect the results to be closer to the second case.
Indeed, as figure the shows, the average degree ratio steadily increases with the 1-degree
and approaches 1 for large 1-degrees. The ratio also becomes less dispersed as the 1-degree
increases. Thus, while very large banks have almost as many 2-degree neighbors as 1-degree
neighbors, the same cannot be said for medium and small banks. The creditors of large
banks seem to be connected to other banks and, more importantly, not all to the same banks.
Although the trend is not clear cut, the degree ratio shifts slightly upwards over time.
Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between 1-degree and 2-degree for firms. In this
context, the 2-degree of a firm gives the number of other firms with whom it shares at least
one common source of credit. Here, the y-axis shows the absolute 2-degree in logarithmic
scale since it is orders of magnitudes larger than the 1-degree. Overall, 1-degree and 2-degree
are positively correlated. For low-degree firms the 2-degree spans several magnitudes. High-
degree firms, that is firms with a larger number of credit connections to different banks, seem
to connect to at least one bank with a large number of creditors. Overall, the average 2-degree
of firms seems to increase over time. This is not surprising given the temporal evolution of
the bank degree distribution discussed before.
In unipartite networks, one popular set of statistics looks at the clustering of nodes. Most
commonly, global clustering and local clustering are distinguished. Global clustering as
introduced by Watts and Strogatz (1998) is a graph-level statistic. It is defined as the number
of triangles, i.e. closed loops of length 3 in the graph G, divided by the number of paths of
length 3.
C3(G) =
∆
L3
(3.3)
where ∆ is the number of triangles in the graph, and L3 is the number of paths of length 3
in the graph. In contrast, local clustering is a node-specific statistic. It indicates the density
of the subgraph spanned by the neighbors of node i. It is defined as the probability that two
neighbors of a node are themselves connected directly:
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Fig. 3.2 1-degree and 2-degree for banks. The x-axis shows the 1-degree
while the y-axis shows the 1-degree, divided by the 2-degree. Conse-
quently, a value of 1 shows that 1-degree and 2-degree are equal.
Fig. 3.3 1-degree and 2-degree for firms. The x-values have been shifted
slightly to the right for each year of the sample in order to make the plot
more readable.
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C3(i) =
2ti
d1(i)(d1(i)−1) (3.4)
where ti is the number of links connecting any two neighbors of node i. Both definitions
of global and local clustering in unipartite networks rely on the existence of loops of length
3. Since by definition loops in bipartite networks must have an even length, the concepts of
local and global clustering can not be transferred directly to bipartite networks. Researchers
have thus come up with various adaptations of the global and local clustering concepts to
bipartite networks.
Robins and Alexander (2004) as well as Latapy et al. (2008) extend the notion of global
clustering to bipartite networks. The authors define a global bipartite clustering coefficient as
four times the number of 4-cycles C4 divided by the number L3 of paths of length three,
CC4 =
4C4
L3
. (3.5)
The coefficient indicates the probability that among four randomly chosen nodes (two
from each set) that are connected by three links, there is also a fourth link present which
closes the loop. One interpretation of the coefficient in our context is to regard it as local
credit portfolio overlap. It thus answers the following question: If bank i provides credit to
firms s and t, and bank j provides credit to firm s, what is the probability that bank j also
provides credit to firm t?2 A coefficient close to 1 would imply that overall, bank portfolios
exhibit a large overlap. A coefficient close to 0 would imply that bank portfolios hardly
exhibit any overlap on average. The last row in table 3.1 shows the global bipartite clustering
coefficient for the empirical networks. It starts off at 0.34 in 1999 and increases to almost 0.5
in 2007. Thus, on average there seems to be significant overlap in bank credit portfolios, and
it increased over sample period. However, in particular given that the support of the bank
degree distribution spans several orders of magnitude, this global perspective yields only
limited information. It is thus necessary to also explore bipartite clustering coefficients on
the local level, in analogy to unipartite networks.
Lind et al. (2005) introduce an adaptation of the local clustering coefficient to bipartite
graphs. The authors define the bipartite clustering coefficient as
2 By symmetry, the coefficient can also answer this question with reversed roles: Given that firm s receives
credit form banks i and j, and firm t receives credit from bank i, what is the probability that form t also receives
credit form bank j?
3.2 Bipartite clustering in the Spanish bank-firm network 55
C4(i) =
∑d(i)m=1∑
d(i)
n=m+1 qi(m,n)
∑d(i)m=1∑
d(i)
n=m+1 [ai(m,n)+qi(m,n)]
. (3.6)
where qi(m,n) = |N(m)∩N(n)| is the number of common neighbors,3 ηi(m,n) = 1+
qi(m,n), and ai(m,n) = (d(m)−ηi(m,n))(d(n)−ηi(m,n)). The numerator gives the number
of realized 4-cycles involving node i. This is equivalent to the size of the intersection of the
neighborhoods of each pair of direct neighbors. The denominator indicates the number of
possible 4-cycles. Note that it takes into account the actual degree of the neighbors m and
n of node i. While the authors present their statistic as a straightforward extension of local
clustering in unipartite graphs, there is a subtle but important conceptual difference between
the local clustering definition in equation 3.4 and the local bipartite clustering coefficient as
defined in equation 3.6 that deserves to be mentioned.
In the definition of local clustering in equation 3.4, the normalizing factor is given in
the denominator as 0.5 ·d1(i)(d1(i)−1). This is the theoretically maximal number of links
between the d1(i) neighbors of node i, regardless of their actual degree. The degrees of
node i’s neighbors do not impact node i’s clustering coefficient. In contrast, the definition in
equation 3.6 explicitly accounts for the degrees of node i’s neighbors.
Fig. 3.4 Illustration of clustering coefficients that account for neighbor
degrees.
Figure 3.4 illustrates this difference with an example. Assume we are interested in the
clustering coefficient of node i. In both subfigures, there is only ti = 1 link connecting its
neighbors, the link between nodes k and l. In subfigure a), each neighbor of node i has a
3The original definition has an additional term that accounts for direct links between neighbors. Since our
network is strictly bipartite, we can safely ignore that component.
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degree of 2. Following the definition of local clustering in equation 3.4, we obtain for the
local clustering coefficient C3(i) = 2·13·2 = 1/3. If instead we ask, in analogy to the definition
of bipartite clustering in equation 3.6, what the theoretical maximal number of links between
neighbors of node i is, given their degree, we see that this maximum is one. Since each of
the nodes j, k and l has a degree of 2, of which one is already used to connect to node i, only
one more link can exist among these three nodes. Thus, a modified clustering coefficient for
node i that accounts for the neighbor degrees would be C′3(i) = 1/1.
In subfigure b), each neighbor of node i has a degree of 3. Now, the maximum number
of links between neighbors of node i is equal to 3 since each of them could theoretically
connect to each other. Just as before, only the link between nodes k and l is realized,
and thus here the conditional clustering coefficient would be equal to its unconditional
counterpart, C3(i) =C′3(i) = 1/3. With a larger number of neighbors and a heterogeneous
distribution of degrees among them, the computation of the maximal number of links in node
i’s neighborhood becomes less trivial.4 This small example shows that the transfer of local
clustering as defined in equation 3.4 to bipartite clustering as defined in equation 3.6 does
not necessarily allow to draw conclusions by analogy.
Fig. 3.5 Lind biclustering for banks
4To the author’s knowledge, no closed-form solution or simple heuristic exists to compute it.
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Figure 3.5 shows the bipartite clustering coefficient of banks plotted against the log node
degree. There is no significant correlation between node degree and clustering coefficient.
However, the dispersion is higher for low-degree nodes, with the coefficients spanning the
full range between 0 and 1. With increasing node degree, this range shrinks to [0.2; 0.5] for
high degrees. Except for very low degree nodes, the clustering coefficients increase over
time. From an economic perspective, the coefficient can be interpreted as follows. For a
given bank i, it denotes how big the overlap is between the creditors of all its debtors. If the
coefficient is equal to 1, all the bank’s debtors share all the same creditors. If the coefficient
is zero, the bank’s debtors do not share any creditors apart from bank i. Thus, for most banks,
there is at least some overlap between their debtors’ creditors.
Latapy et al. (2008) and Borgatti and Everett (1997) provide an alternative definition of a
bipartite clustering coefficient for pairs of nodes belonging to the same set. For two nodes i
and j, it is defined in equation 3.7 as the number of common neighbors, normalized by the
size of the union of the two neighborhoods.
CC(i, j) =
|N(i)∩N( j)|
|N(i)∪N( j)| (3.7)
If the overlap between the neighborhoods of node i and j is large, then also this clustering
coefficient is closer to one. For disjoint neighborhoods, it is equal to 0. The coefficients are
then reduced to individual node coefficients CC(i) by averaging the pairwise coefficients
over all node pairs (i,k) for which the neighborhood intersection is not empty,
CC(i) =
∑k∈N(N(i))CC(i,k)
|N(N(i))| . (3.8)
As Latapy et al. (2008) point out, definition 3.7 faces a potential drawback if the degree
distribution in the node set is very dispersed. For two nodes i and j with |N(i)|>> |N( j)|,
the resulting clustering coefficient will necessarily be very small. The reason is that the
numerator in equation 3.7 has the smaller degree as an upper bound, |N(i)∩N( j)| ≤ |N( j)|,
while the denominator has the larger degree as a lower bound, |N(i)∪N( j)| ≥ |N(i)|. In our
data, the ratio between the largest and the smallest bank degree is on the order of 105, and
thus this issue is relevant here.
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In order to circumvent this problem, Latapy et al. (2008) propose to replace the denomi-
nator either with the smaller or the larger degree of the two nodes. This results in the min
clustering coefficient
CCmin(i, j) =
|N(i)∩N( j)|
min(|N(i)|, |N( j)|) (3.9)
and the max clustering coefficient
CCmax(i, j) =
|N(i)∩N( j)|
max(|N(i)|, |N( j)|) (3.10)
which both are then reduced to coefficients for individual nodes in analogy to equation
3.8. We refer to the coefficient based on equation 3.7 as union clustering, to the one based on
equation 3.9 as min clustering and the one based on equation 3.10 as max clustering.
Figure 3.6 shows the min and max clustering coefficients for banks, plotted against the
node degree. The union clustering coefficient is not depicted here since it is almost identical
to the max clustering coefficient. The max clustering coefficient in figure 3.6b is very close
to zero for most banks. Only very few low-degree banks have a coefficient larger than zero.
The only way large-degree banks could have a max clustering effect significantly different
from zero is for their debtors to be connected to other large-degree banks. Given that there are
only few large degree banks in our data, this would imply a tightly knit club of a small number
of banks with a large number of firms. However, the data do not support this hypothesis.
In contrast, figure 3.6a shows a u-shaped relationship between the min clustering coeffi-
cient and the degree. Min clustering decreases rapidly to zero for the degree increasing from
one upwards. The coefficient then increases again for large degrees. Thus, low-degree banks
exhibit significant portfolio overlap with the creditors of their debtors. To a lesser extent,
also high-degree banks exhibit portfolio overlap. However, this overlap occurs most likely on
the side of their debtors’ low degree creditors since in equation 3.9 the denominator selects
their degree instead of the high degree of node i.
The graphic shows that the min clustering coefficient for high-degree nodes decreased
over the sample period. For the most connected nodes, a similar grouping arises as in the
empirical degree distribution, with the data of the years 1999-2001,2002-2004 and 2005-2007
each being grouped close together.
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(a) min (b) max
Fig. 3.6 Local biclustering coefficients.
As a related statistic, Latapy et al. (2008) also introduce the redundancy coefficient. Its
definition is given in equation 3.11. For a node i, the redundancy coefficient is defined as the
fraction of the pairs of the direct neighbors of i that are also connected via a path of length
2 through a node other than i. It thus gives the fraction of pairs of neighbors of node i that
would still be connected via a path of length 2 even if node i was removed.
rc(i) =
|{{ j,k} ⊆ N(i),∃i′ ̸= i,(i′, j) ∈ E and (i′,k) ∈ E}|
0.5|N(i)|(|N(i)|−1) (3.11)
With regard to projections, this coefficient also indicates whether the projections would
change much if node i was removed from the bipartite graph. Thus, whereas the bipartite
clustering coefficients indicates the local density, the redundancy coefficient asks whether the
number of length-2 paths between two nodes is larger than one. In our context, the redundancy
coefficient for banks gives the proportion of its debtors that would still be connected to a
common creditor even if this particular bank was on longer part of the network. In a less
extreme case, let us assume that one bank starts reducing its credit exposures. If the bank has
a high redundancy coefficient, the bank’s debtors share the same funding alternatives. Thus,
these banks may be receive simultaneous requests for credit extensions from their existing
debtors. In contrast, if the first bank had a low redundancy coefficient, these financing
requests would be more dispersed in the banking system.
Figure 3.7 plots the bank redundancy coefficient against the bank degree. Overall, bank
redundancy correlates negatively with the degree. Also the redundancy coefficients become
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less dispersed for increasing node degree. For high degrees, the range spanned by the
redundancy coefficients decreases from the interval [0;1] to the narrow range [0.1;0.3]. In
contrast to the min clustering coefficient before, there is no evidence of a temporal trend. In
economic terms, only a small fraction of debtors of large banks shares common creditors
beyond that particular bank. For smaller banks, a larger proportion of its debtors share
multiple creditors.
Fig. 3.7 1-degree and redundancy coefficient for banks.
3.2.3 Projections
As discussed in section 3.2.1, one way to circumvent the challenges associated with statistics
on bipartite networks is to examine the one-mode projections. For computational reasons,
we restrict ourselves at this point to the analysis of the top projections. Table 3.2 shows
the summary statistics for the projections. The number of nodes nt is of course identical to
the number of banks in the bipartite networks. The number of links Z decreases over time,
though not monotonously. The resulting density D of the networks is low and almost constant,
ranging between 7% and 9% over the sample period. The minimum bank degree min(d) in
the projection is zero. This is the case for banks that have only have one counterparty. The
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median degree med(d) is almost constant over the sample period. The mean degree mean(d)
also shows little variation and is consistently larger than the median degree, indicating that
the distribution is right-skewed. The maximum degree max(d) decreases slightly over time,
analogous to the decrease in firm degrees in the bipartite network. Taken together, the degree
distribution as shown in Figure 3.8 appears to be fairly stable over time. Global clustering
C3 as defined in equation 3.3 hovers around 0.45. This is very large compared to random
networks, in line with the discussion in section 3.2.1. The table also reports the assortativity
A of the network. It is defined as the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between a node’s
degree and the average degree of its neighbors, averaged over all nodes in the network. All
graphs in our sample exhibit strong disassortative mixing, that is, the assortativity is smaller
than 0. Moreover, it is nearly constant over time.
Figure 3.9 shows the local clustering coefficients. Both figures 3.8 and 3.9 illustrate
the loss of information due to the use of projections. In contrast to some of the bipartite
clustering statistics employed earlier, we cannot identify any trends over the sample period
from the statistics of the projection networks.
nt Z D min(d) med(d) mean(d) max(d) C3 A
1999 227 3920 0.08 0 21.00 34.54 190 0.45 -0.43
2000 216 3501 0.08 0 19.50 32.42 183 0.44 -0.44
2001 218 3434 0.07 0 19.00 31.50 189 0.43 -0.45
2002 214 3663 0.08 0 21.50 34.23 188 0.44 -0.45
2003 213 3761 0.08 0 22.00 35.31 192 0.44 -0.46
2004 209 3578 0.08 0 22.00 34.24 187 0.43 -0.45
2005 189 3280 0.09 0 22.00 34.71 166 0.47 -0.45
2006 195 3372 0.09 0 22.00 34.58 171 0.45 -0.45
2007 193 3315 0.09 0 22.00 34.35 174 0.45 -0.46
Table 3.2 Summary statistics for the empirical top projections: number of
nodes nt ; number of links Z; network density D; minimum, median, mean
and maximum degree; global clustering C3; and assortativity A.
3.3 Comparison to random bipartite networks
The previous chapter introduced a number of statistics for bipartite graphs and described the
empirical bank-firm networks of the Spanish economy. In this chapter we go one step further
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Fig. 3.8 Cumulative bank degree distribution, projections.
and compare the bipartite structure of the empirical networks to random bipartite networks.
More precisely, we do not know to what extent the bipartite clustering coefficients that we
observe are a consequence of the particular degree sequence of our bipartite networks, and
to what extent they contain additional information. We want to distinguish those bipartite
clustering values that arise naturally as a consequence of the degree sequence from those that
arise specifically in our empirical data. For this purpose, we generate random networks with
the same number of nodes as the empirical ones. We then calculate the bipartite clustering
coefficients on these new networks and compare them to the empirical ones.
The question as to what extent local node properties such as the node degree distribu-
tion determine global network properties such as clustering is subject to ongoing research.
Squartini et al. (2011a) and Squartini et al. (2011b) analyze the world trade web with respect
to this problem. They find that if the network is unweighted, the degree sequence is fully
informative. In other words, the assortative behavior and the clustering that are found in the
network are typical for the given degree distribution. In contrast, for the weighted networks,
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Fig. 3.9 Local clustering of banks, projections.
the values of these global properties differ significantly from their random counterparts and
yield thus additional information.
The first question regarding the generation of random benchmark networks is whether
we want to keep the node degrees in a statistical sense by preserving the mean node degree,
or whether we insist on keeping the actual degree sequence. The former approach leads to
random graph models while the latter are termed configuration models. Since the random
graph approach only preserves the mean degree, it is best suited for networks where the
degree distribution spans a narrow range and is fairly symmetrical. Given the large support of
the bank degree distribution and its skewness, the random graph approach is thus most likely
to produce vastly different graphs in our case. We thus use a configuration model, keeping the
actual degrees of banks and firms from the empirical data but linking them randomly. This
can be done in several ways. One approach that is often used is the Local Rewiring Algorithm
(LRA) as described by Squartini et al. (2011a), among others. The algorithm consists of the
repetition of a single step, often called link swap. First, we randomly select two links l1 and
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l2 from the network. Let link l1 connect the nodes a and b, and link l2 connect the nodes c
and d. It is important that the nodes a, b, c, and d are four distinct nodes, that is the links l1
and l2 must not share nodes. Then, we delete the links l1 and l2 in the network and replace
them with the new links l′1 connecting nodes a and d and link l
′
2 connecting nodes b and c.
One can model this procedure as a Markov Process where each admissible network is one
state of the world. For a detailed discussion of the LRA and possible extensions, see Maslov
and Sneppen (2002), Maslov et al. (2004), Serrano et al. (2007) and Opsahl et al. (2008).
The LRA shares a shortcoming with other network generating algorithms, and that is the
fact that it may produce biased results. In other words, not all networks that are specified
by fixing the degree sequence are equally likely to be generated. A detailed description
of how the bias arises and potential remedies are described by Artzy-Randrup and Stone
(2005). The authors suggest an extension of the LRA that they term “Switching and Holding”
strategy. It manipulates the Markov transition probabilities in the above approach, i.e. the
probability for the link pair to be swapped, in a way as to guarantee a uniform distribution
over the graphs. Coolen et al. (2009) and Roberts and Coolen (2012) discuss this problem in
a general framework for the analysis of constrained graph dynamics. The former develop the
general solution for undirected graphs while the latter extend it to directed graphs. While
these approaches are theoretically feasible, they are too computationally expensive for our
purposes. Furthermore, the extension of these algorithms to bipartite networks has not yet
been explored in practice.
As a consequence, we rely on a simpler, so-called degree-stub approach to generating
random networks. Instead of starting with a complete network and then pairwise rewiring the
links, we remove initially all the links from a network. The remaining skeleton contains only
the nodes and for each node its target degree. We then pick randomly one top and one bottom
node. If both have not yet reached their target degree, we link them together. If one of the
nodes or both have already reached their target degree, or if there is already a link connecting
these two nodes, we discard the pair and draw a new one. This procedure is repeated until all
nodes have reached their target degree. For unipartite networks Squartini et al. (2013) and
Squartini et al. (2015) point out that also this approach may be biased. However, since the
question has not yet been answered for the case of bipartite networks, we give it the benefit
of the doubt.
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With the approach described above, we generate 100 random networks for each empirical
network. Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics for the simulated bigraphs. Each cell shows
the mean value over all 100 simulations, with the standard deviation given in parentheses.
Just like their empirical counterparts, the largest connected components in the simulated
networks cover nearly the entire network. The shortest average path lengths are, on average,
significantly lower than those in the empirical networks. The simulated networks also have
higher global biclustering coefficients. As an additional statistic, we look at the Jaccard Index
to measure network similarity. It is defined on pairs of networks as
J =
Z11
Z11+Z10+Z01
(3.12)
where Z11 is the number of links that are present in both networks, and Z01 and Z10 are
the number of links that are present only in one of the networks but not in the other.
Jemp represents the average Jaccard index between each simulated network and its
empirical counterpart. We can see that on average less than 10% of the links present in the
empirical networks are also generated randomly in the empirical ones. Jsim represents the
average Jaccard index over all 4550 unique pairings of simulated networks for each year.
The similarity among them is of a similar magnitude as the similarity between simulated and
empirical networks.5
We now look at the statistics we discussed in the previous section, computed for the
simulated networks. Here we only report the results for the networks based upon the empirical
network of 1999. The results for the other years are comparable, and the corresponding
graphics can be found in the appendix.
Figure 3.10 shows the 1-degree and the degree ratio for banks, both for the empirical
network (red) and the simulated ones (grey). Of course the 1-degree is the same for simulated
and empirical networks. Thus, any difference between simulated and empirical networks
in this figure arises from differences in the linking structure between firms and banks. For
both empirical and simulated data, the degree ratio is positively correlated with the 1-degree.
However, the figure shows that the simulated networks exhibit lower degree ratios for almost
5One has to interpret this statistic with caution. Since the nodes in our networks are only identified by their
degree, it might be possible to arrive at a higher Jaccard index by switching nodes with the same degree in one
network in order to increase network similarity. That is, if nodes k and l (both belonging to the same set) have
the same degree, we could assign the links for node k to node l and vice versa.
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|LCC| |LCCt | |LCCb| S CC4 Jsim Jemp
1999 54272(0.0) 224(0.0) 54048(0.0) 3.24(0.011) 0.44(0.0012) 0.07(0.0005) 0.08(0.0006)
2000 60221(0.6) 215(0.5) 60006(0.1) 3.24(0.011) 0.47(0.0012) 0.09(0.0005) 0.09(0.0005)
2001 61644(0.3) 217(0.2) 61427(0.1) 3.24(0.016) 0.46(0.0010) 0.09(0.0005) 0.09(0.0005)
2002 98500(0.0) 213(0.0) 98287(0.0) 3.06(0.006) 0.52(0.0013) 0.07(0.0004) 0.07(0.0004)
2003 108731(0.0) 212(0.0) 108519(0.0) 3.02(0.007) 0.52(0.0013) 0.07(0.0004) 0.07(0.0003)
2004 119713(0.4) 208(0.2) 119505(0.1) 2.99(0.009) 0.53(0.0012) 0.07(0.0004) 0.07(0.0004)
2005 183925(0.4) 188(0.2) 183737(0.1) 3.05(0.015) 0.59(0.0010) 0.06(0.0003) 0.06(0.0003)
2006 206646(0.5) 194(0.3) 206452(0.2) 3.09(0.017) 0.61(0.0010) 0.06(0.0003) 0.06(0.0002)
2007 202882(0.4) 191(0.2) 202690(0.1) 3.08(0.016) 0.62(0.0009) 0.06(0.0003) 0.06(0.0003)
Table 3.3 Summary statistics for the simulated bigraphs. For each year,
the table shows the size of the largest connected component for the total
network (LCC) as well as for banks (LCCt) and firms (LCCb); the average
shortest path length S; and the global clustering coefficient CC4; and the
Jaccard indices for the simulated networks (Jsim) and for the empirical
networks (Jemp). Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
all banks. This is equivalent to stating that the simulated networks produce higher 2-degrees.
Since the sum of bank degrees is the same in the simulated and the empirical networks, the
only admissible interpretation is that in the simulated networks there is less overlap in the
neighborhoods of firms that have at least one common creditor. Furthermore, the degree ratio
is far less dispersed for the simulated networks.
Figure 3.11 shows the 2-degree for the firms. For small 1-degrees, the simulated and
empirical data match well. As the 1-degree increases, the 2-degrees of the simulated networks
span a larger ranges compared to their empirical counterparts. The 2-degrees of the empirical
networks tend to be located close to the upper limit of these ranges. Taken together, the firms
in the simulated networks exhibit lower 2-degrees on average.
Figure 3.12 shows the biclustering coefficients. The coefficients of the random networks
differ significantly from their empirical counterparts. While 1-degree and biclustering
coefficient are negatively correlated for the empirical data, the simulated data show a positive
correlation. For both networks the dispersion of the clustering coefficient decreases with
increasing 1-degree. However, overall the empirical data are far less dispersed than their
empirical counterparts. This is similar to the results obtained for the 2-degree of banks in
figure 3.10.
Figure 3.13 shows the min clustering coefficients. Overall the empirical data lie well
within the narrow band spanned by the simulated networks. The figure shows the same
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Fig. 3.10 Random networks: 1-degree and 2-degree, banks.
Fig. 3.11 Random networks: 1-degree and 2-degree, firms.
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Fig. 3.12 Random networks: Lind biclustering, banks.
u-shaped relationship for the coefficients of the empirical and simulated networks. The
only noteworthy difference is that for the two nodes with the highest degree, the empirical
coefficients are slightly larger than their simulated counterparts.
Figure 3.14 shows the max clustering coefficient as defined in equation 3.10. While the
coefficient does not deviate visibly from zero for the empirical graph, the coefficients of the
simulated networks span the interval [0.0;1.0] for low degrees before they gradually decline
to zero for degrees larger than 50. The empirical coefficients are well within the range of
the simulated networks. They tend to stay at the lower bound of the range spanned by their
simulated pendants.
Figure 3.15 shows the redundancy coefficients. Here, the difference between simulations
and the empirical data is quite visible. For the simulated networks, except for a few low-
degree nodes, no coefficient deviates from zero. This stands in stark contrast to the coefficients
derived from the empirical network. They are scattered in a significantly broader range that
becomes slightly narrower with increasing 1-degree.
Table 3.4 shows the aggregate network statistics for the bank projections. Each cell shows
the average value across all 100 simulations, with the standard deviation given in parentheses.
On average, the projections of the simulated networks have more than double the number of
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Fig. 3.13 Random networks: min clustering, banks.
Fig. 3.14 Random networks: max clustering, banks.
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Fig. 3.15 Random networks: redundancy, banks.
links than the empirical projections. Of course, this implies the same relation in the network
densities since the number of nodes is equal in empirical and simulated projections. Global
clustering is also significantly higher in the simulated networks. Its average exceeds 0.7 over
the whole sample period, compared to around 0.45 for the empirical projections. In contrast
to the empirical projections, the simulated projections exhibit slightly positive assortativity.
Taken together, while the projections do not indicate trends over the sample period, the
empirical projections differ significantly from their simulated counterparts. This difference
is further confirmed in the degree distributions of the simulated and empirical projections
in figure 3.16. In the empirical projections, 80% of banks have a degree of less than 60.
In contrast, in the simulated projections 40% of the banks have a degree of more than 130.
Figure 3.17 shows the local clustering coefficients. They stay on one level around 0.7 for
small 1-degrees. Only for 1-degrees larger than 100 do they correlate negatively with the
degree. In contrast, the empirical data do not exhibit this plateau for small degrees.
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Z D C3 A
1999 9910(53) 0.19(0.001) 0.72(0.003) 0.06(0.019)
2000 9018(50) 0.19(0.001) 0.71(0.003) 0.04(0.019)
2001 9224(52) 0.19(0.001) 0.71(0.003) 0.04(0.020)
2002 10665(52) 0.23(0.001) 0.74(0.003) 0.07(0.017)
2003 10956(48) 0.24(0.001) 0.75(0.003) 0.07(0.016)
2004 10918(54) 0.25(0.001) 0.76(0.002) 0.07(0.017)
2005 8599(42) 0.24(0.001) 0.79(0.003) 0.10(0.020)
2006 8868(48) 0.23(0.001) 0.79(0.003) 0.10(0.016)
2007 8678(45) 0.23(0.001) 0.78(0.003) 0.09(0.017)
Table 3.4 Summary statistics for the simulated top projections. For each
year, the table shows the number of links Z; the network density D; the
global clustering coefficient C3; and the assortativity A. Standard devia-
tions are given in parentheses.
3.4 Conclusions
This paper had two intertwined goals. The first goal was to describe the linking structure of
the Spanish bank-firm credit network, and to test whether it can be considered random. The
second goal was to examine different statistics on bipartite graphs as to whether they can
detect differences between empirical and random networks. As for the first goal, we have
provided strong evidence for nonrandom linking behavior in the Spanish bank-firm credit
network. The second goal needs to be answered in a more detailed manner. The statistics
employed in this study performed differently, both in detecting trends over time, and in
distinguishing random and empirical networks.
Our first candidate statistic was the 2-degree. For both banks and firms, this statistic
exhibits subtle trends over time. However, the statistic yields different results for banks and
firms regarding the distinction of simulated and empirical networks. For banks, the degree
ratio of the simulated networks moves in a narrow band. The data points of the empirical
networks are clearly outside that band. For firms, the 2-degrees in the simulated networks
exhibit a broader range than the ones in the empirical networks. The data points of the
empirical networks are located at the upper limit of that range.
Next, we examined the biclustering coefficient. For the empirical networks, this coeffi-
cient does not exhibit a significant correlation with the 1-degree. However, the dispersion of
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Fig. 3.16 Random networks: degree distribution of projections, banks.
the statistic decreases for increasing 1-degree. Also, there is a slight temporal trend visible.
The biclustering coefficients in the simulated networks differ visibly from their empirical
counterparts. They do not mirror the dispersion of the empirical coefficients but move in a
narrow band, except for a few outliers. Moreover, the coefficients of the simulated networks
are positively correlated with the 1-degree.
Union, min and max clustering differed in their performance both regarding the detection
of temporal trends and the distinction of simulated and empirical data. Given the wide support
of the bank degree distribution, union and max clustering turned out not to be very useful
for our purposes. Both coefficients are very close to zero for most nodes. Min clustering,
however, exhibited a u-shaped relationship to the 1-degree. For the most connected nodes,
we also found a grouping over the years similar to the one in the degree distribution. The min
clustering coefficients of the empirical networks were well within the narrow range spanned
by their simulated counterparts. It was thus unable to detect any differences between the
empirical and the simulated networks.
The most pronounced distinction between the empirical and the simulated networks is
given by the redundancy coefficient. It is dispersed over a broad range for the empirical
networks. In the simulated networks, however, it remains very close to zero for most nodes.
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Fig. 3.17 Random networks: clustering in projections, banks.
The top projections of our data exhibit significant differences to their simulated pendants.
The simulated networks are twice as dense as their empirical counterparts. They also have a
significantly higher clustering coefficient. And while the empirical projections are strongly
disassortative, the simulated networks are slightly assortative.
Moving beyond the statistics, what do these differences from random networks imply
for financial and economic stability? On a global scale, the larger empirical 2-degree for
small and medium-sized banks indicates that their debtors tend to share a large proportion
of their financing alternatives. For large banks, the overlap between their debtor’s creditors
is less pronounced as compared to the random benchmark. Consequently, changes in the
policy of a big bank, or even a default, is likely to spread out more among its debtor’s other
creditors. From a stability perspective, two consequences are possible. Either this spreading
out dissipates the initial shock to an extent that is easily absorbed by the system. Or, in the
case of a more severe shock, the distress spreads faster through the network since the affected
number of banks is larger. Which of these two is more likely depends on parameters that are
outside the scope of this paper, such as the size of loans and the behavior of banks and firms.
On the local level, the picture that emerges is slightly different. Both the biclustering
coefficient and the redundancy coefficient indicate that for small banks, local clustering is
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more pronounced than for large banks. The higher biclustering coefficient implies a larger
proportion of pairwise credit portfolio overlaps for small and medium banks. Similarly, the
higher redundancy coefficient for small and medium banks implies that in case of financial
constraints imposed by one bank, other banks would be affected by reactions from multiple
firms at the same time.
To sum up, the joint analysis of several bipartite clustering statistics has allowed us to
clearly establish the nonrandom linking structure in the Spanish bank-firm network. While
not all the measures we employed were able to detect these differences, they are nevertheless
stable over the sample period. Three directions for further research emerge from the insights
gained here. First, the exact behavior of these statistics and their relations to each other
deserve further research efforts. Besides deepening our understanding of each of them, this
will help to arrive at a commonly agreed upon set of measures for bipartite networks. Second,
the question of why the empirical data deviate from their random pendants deserves attention.
Richer datasets of bank-firm networks may explore possible avenues of explanation such as
balance sheet variables, sectoral differences and geography. Finally, the implications of the
bipartite particularities identified here for stability need to be explored along the lines of Lux
(2016).
Chapter 4
Interactions of Macroprudential and
Monetary Policy in Housing Markets
4.1 Introduction
Housing markets have played a pivotal role in many of the financial and banking crises in
modern history. White et al. (2014) estimate that housing booms have preceded the majority
of financial crises in recent years. With house purchases often being credit financed, they
lend themselves to classic boom-bust cycles à la Kindleberger and O’Keefe (2001). This
susceptibility for deep and prolonged crises is aggravated by housing supply being slow to
adjust, and the indivisibility of housing (Hartmann 2015). In the Euro Area, at the end of
2016 outstanding housing credit stood at almost 150 % of GDP while outstanding housing
credit constituted almost 15% of bank’s total assets. Thus by size alone, the sector poses a
potential risk to the financial system and the broader economy alike. On the household side,
housing often constitutes the largest component of wealth.
This repeated occurrence of financial crises (Allen and Carletti 2013), in particular the
Global Financial Crisis that started in 2007, has made it clear that monetary policy alone
is inadequate to ensure financial stability. Not only is this not a primary goal of monetary
policy (Taylor 2007), but even if it were, its effectiveness can be quite limited, as Lambertini
et al. (2013) demonstrate. Thus, a further branch of regulation aimed at increasing the
overall stability of the financial system, or macroprudential policy, has been continuously
developed in the past years. The tool set available to macroprudential policy makers these
days is broad. Among the options listed in ESRB (2014) are countercyclical as well as
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systemic risk capital buffers, and caps on bank leverage ratios, loan-to-value (LTV) ratios
and debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratios. The novelty of these policy measures as compared
to conventional monetary instruments, and the complex interactions between monetary
and macroprudential policy, market participants and market dynamics make the impact
assessment of macroprudential regulation an active area of research.
This paper contributes to the development of macroprudential policy by examining the
joint effects of monetary policy and macroprudential policy on housing markets. In an agent-
based model with agents following simple heuristics similar to those found in real-world
housing markets, we explore the combined impact of interest rates on the one hand and
maximum LTV and DSTI ratios on the other hand on the market outcome. Compared to
generalizations drawn from empirical studies, our approach allows for potentially nonlinear
feedback effects (Turrell 2016) and endogenous interactions between regulation, loan portfo-
lios and housing markets. It thus responds to the need for an integrated analytical framework
that has been pointed out by Galati and Moessner (2013) and others. Section 4.2 reviews
the literature, section 4.3 presents and discusses our model design. Section 4.4 presents the
results of our simulations, and section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Literature
Although the Global Financial Crisis has boosted the discussion and development of macro-
prudential policy measures, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the ultimate
roots of the housing bubble (Glaeser et al. 2012). A series of papers (Geanakoplos 2001;
2010a;b) makes the case for high bank leverage and low collateral requirements and against
low interest rates as the primary causes. In a similar vein, Khandani et al. (2013) maintain
that credit market conditions, not interest rates were the main driver of the pre-crisis housing
boom. Duca et al (2011) as well as Haughwout (2011) agree on the importance of leverage for
the crisis. However, the empirical analysis by Glaeser et al. (2012) raises doubts on leverage
as the primary culprit of the housing boom in the early 2000s. The common denominator
of this strand of literature is the agreement on the need for macroprudential regulation as a
complement to monetary policy.
The origins of the concept of macroprudential regulation can be traced back all the way to
the 1970s (Clement 2010). It is however not until the 2000s, especially after the onset of the
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Global Financial Crisis in 2007 that the topic has received increased attention by academics
and regulators alike (Hartmann 2015). Given the link between credit-fueled housing bubbles
and financial crises, regulatory authorities around the world have begun to put increased focus
on indirect housing market supervision through bank regulation. For a review of the debate
surrounding the evolution of macroprudential regulation, see Clement (2010) and Galati
and Moessner (2013). Nier et al. (2011) provide a discussion of the institutional designs of
macroprudential policy. Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015) document the increase in the
use of macroprudential policy measures following the onset of the Global Financial Crisis.
Discussions of the macroprudential policy tool box and their rationale can be found
in Galati and Moessner (2013), Wachtel (2013) and Draghi (2014). Of these, Galati and
Moessner (2013) highlight in particular the need to examine the potential interaction effects
between monetary and macroprudential policy, though in their review the latter is mainly
restricted to capital-based measures. Regarding the subset of borrower-based measures,
Hartmann (2015) finds that LTVs, employed in 16 EU countries, are the most frequently
used measure. This is confirmed by Darbar and Wu (2016) who, in a set of five case studies,
find LTV ratios and DSTI ratios among the most popular macroprudential measures.
Assessing the effectiveness of macroprudential policy measures is still subject to ongoing
research.1 Since this type of policy is still at a comparatively early stage, the amount of
empirical data is limited. Furthermore, cross-country heterogeneity severely limits the room
for robust conclusions, as Hartmann (2015) points out. Alberola et al. (2011) analyze ten
years of Spanish experience in macroprudential regulation. They come to the conclusion that
dynamic risk provisions helped mitigate the build up of risk. The authors also hint at the
unresolved challenge of integrating monetary policy and financial stability. Darbar and Wu
(2016) provide country-specific descriptive analyses of macroprudential regulation for a set
of five countries. The heterogeneity of the sample however prohibits generally applicable
conclusions, highlighting one of the main challenges for the empirical impact assessment.
Similarly, in a comprehensive analysis of the effects of macroprudential regulation in 49
countries, Lim et al. (2011) point to country heterogeneity as one of the main challenges.
Cerutti et al. (2015) find macroprudential regulation to be more effective in less developed
and more closed economies. Their analysis suggests that regulatory arbitrage may still be one
1Going even further, Galati and Moessner (2013) maintain that there is still no definite agreement on the
very goals of macroprudential policy.
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of the biggest hurdles for effective macroprudential regulation. Reinhardt and Sowerbutts
(2015) present similar findings. The authors examine regulatory arbitrage as a reaction
to macroprudential regulation. They find that while capital-based policy measures allow
foreign branches to benefit from looser regulation in their respective home countries, policies
aimed at the regulation of lending standards are more likely to provide a level playing field.
Claessens et al. (2013) find that lending-based measures as well as measures aimed at curbing
bank credit growth are more effective than countercyclical capital buffers in combating
systemic risk. Overall, macroprudential policies are found to be more effective in reducing
the boom than in mitigating realized systemic risk during the bust. This assessment is shared
by Cerutti et al. (2015). Vandenbussche et al. (2015) analyze macroprudential measures in
Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe and find capital-based approaches to be the most
effective.
On the theoretical side, Allen and Carletti (2013) demonstrate the effects of macropru-
dential policy in a rational agent model with a “normal” and a “boom and bust” regime. The
authors find that low interest rates can trigger a housing bubble if sufficiently high LTV caps
allow for a corresponding credit expansion. This demonstrates the need for a joint analysis
of macroprudential and monetary policy. LTV caps themselves limit bubbles effectively, but
the authors complement the empirical findings by pointing out that in regulatory practice the
challenge to close loopholes such as foreign financing continues to exist. Agur and Demertzis
(2015) provide a simple analytical model of the decision problem of banks facing monetary
policy and macroprudential regulation. They show that even in the presence of macropruden-
tial regulation, monetary policy still has an impact on financial stability. Benigno et al. (2011)
study the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential regulation in a model
with nominal rigidity and financial frictions. The authors make a case for monetary policy
to focus on inflation targets. Within their model, the gain in welfare from inflation-focused
monetary policy always outweighs the costs in terms of financial stability.
Moving from the supply to the demand side, a number of authors have put forward models
of housing markets aimed at replicating the stylized facts of boom-bust cycles. Barras (2005)
provide a model of the London housing market. They note that rents and leases are slow to
respond to market changes, due to long-running contracts. Given the low adjustment speed of
supply that is inherent in housing markets, construction is always of speculative nature. For
London, the authors document an average construction delay of two to three years and price
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cycles with an average length of 12-15 years. Vacancies are negatively related to rent prices
and positively related to the rate of completion while developments seems to extrapolate rent
changes: high changes in real rent are followed by increased new construction. The authors
then provide a model for the housing market in lagged linear differential equations based on
a New-Keynesian growth model. Boom-bust cycles emerge endogenously as the result of
fluctuations in construction, rent prices and vacancy rates.
Glaeser et al. (2008) provide a model where rational bubbles can exist only under the
condition of a constant housing supply. However, if agents can exhibit irrational optimism,
housing booms can also take place when housing supply is elastic. In this case, the benefit of
shorter bubbles is outweighed by the costs of a larger build-up during the bubble, leading to
an ultimate welfare loss from housing supply elasticity. The authors also point out that high
transaction costs and the lack of short-selling opportunities may be partially responsible for
sustained deviations from fundamentals.
In a setting of incomplete information, Glaeser and Nathanson (2015) provide a model
with house buyers extrapolating recent transaction price trends into the future. These naive
beliefs are sufficient to induce price swings that are in line with empirical facts. In particular,
their model replicates house price momentum over one year, mean reversal over five years
and excess long-term volatility.
The models discussed so far operate with representative agents. By construction then, they
neglect the potential impact of household income and wealth distributions on housing market
dynamics. However, several authors have argued that these features might be important
to explain the recent housing bubble (Turrell 2016, Shiller 2012, Rajan 2011). Some, if
not all (Baptista et al. 2016) of these shortcomings can be compensated for in agent-based
models. By modeling not the aggregate market but the individual participants, household
heterogeneity can easily be included into the model design. Agent-based models have
also been used for years in the mortgage industry for the prediction of mortgage portfolio
performance and prepayment prediction (Geanakoplos et al. 2012).
Gilbert et al. (2009) provide one of the first agent-based models of a housing market.
In their spatial model, the authors focus on the interaction between buyers, sellers and
realtors. Houses have a fixed location, and realtors cover specific geographical regions of
the market. This is also reflected in the price setting, with prices of newly available houses
being determined by the prices of recent transactions in the local neighborhood. The model
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incorporates LTV caps and a broad analogy to what can be thought of as DSTIs. Households
trade houses if the ratio of debt service to current income leaves a pre-specified band. The
model demonstrates the emergence of richer and poorer areas as a result of the location-
dependent price-setting. On the policy side, lower LTVs are shown to reduce the interest rate
sensitivity of house prices.
Kouwenberg and Zwinkels (2015) adapt the methodology of numerical agent-based
models as they have been pioneered in financial economics. In these models, agents are not
modeled explicitly on the individual agent level. Instead, the proportions of a finite number of
agent types in the population changes endogenously. In close analogy to structurally similar
models of financial markets, the model produces endogenous house price fluctuations.
Erlingsson et al. (2014) examine the interaction of housing markets and business cycles
in an agent-based model. The authors find a u-shaped relationship between credit conditions
and output. While housing credit expansion may increase output in the short run, it makes
the economy more susceptible to recessions. If credit conditions become too tight, however,
output also suffers.
McMahon et al. (2011) run policy experiments in a spatial model of the housing market.
The authors impose the actual interest rates set by the Federal reserve over the years 1993-
2009 onto their model and show that this is sufficient to generate a housing bubble that bursts
in 2007. However, the lack of explicit lending standards makes it impossible to compare this
hypothesis to alternatives such as the often discussed low lending standards.
Pangallo et al. (2016) and Ge (2013) examine the interactions of income distributions
and spatial segregation in housing markets. Ge (2013) find that ease of access to credit
is positively correlated with higher prices but also with price volatility and the number of
foreclosures. The presence of investors in the model, i.e. agents who buy to rent, increases
spatial segregation.
Geanakoplos et al. (2012) build a detailed model of the housing market in the greater
Washington D.C. area. The major innovation of their work is that it is built upon merged agent-
level data on household income and wealth, housing features, transaction data and mortgage
service data. In comparison to the previously discussed models, their framework allows for
the detailed simulation of agent-level procedures of household search, loan approval and
mortgage service. This illustrates the closer mapping between model and observed reality
that can be implemented in computational agent-based models as opposed to more abstract
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representations in the representative agent models discussed above. The authors succeed at
replicating a variety of housing market statistics during the housing boom in the early 2000s.
Using counterfactual simulations, the authors show that stricter lending standards in the form
of lower LTVs would have been sufficient to prevent the housing bubble.
This approach is taken up by Baptista et al. (2016) who modify and extend the model
by Geanakoplos et al. (2012) in their analysis of the UK housing market. Again in a model
based on a vast array of agent-level empirical data, the authors find that the introduction of
maximum loan-to-income ratios can significantly reduce housing booms.
4.3 Model Structure
Our model consists of n0h houses, n
0
hh households and nb banks. Households have an initial
income which is drawn from a gamma distribution, as proposed by Salem and Mount (1974),
McDonald (1984) and Singh and Maddala (2008), plus a minimum income imin. The gamma
distribution is capped at the 99.5%-ile, and thus the support of household incomes is given
by [imin,Γ−1(.995)]. Households also start with an initial wealth in the form of cash. It is set
to a fixed multiple of their initial income, ci = γ · ii(0). Households are assumed to have an
infinite lifespan. They may own a house, and they may take out a mortgage for purchasing a
house. Households may move to another house within the model and they may exit from the
model. We assume the houses to have an infinite lifespan, too, and unit size. Banks are the
most passive actors in our model. They are only represented by the portfolio of loans they
have granted, and the profit they earn on it. Banks have a maximum loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and a maximum debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratio, both of which limit the size of
loans they can offer to households. Both LTV and DSTI ratios are treated as exogenous in
our model, representing regulatory constraints. The interest rate at which loans are offered is
assumed to be exogenous, too, and the same for all banks. For the most part, we bundle all
loans into one portfolio, equivalent to one bank. The model can easily be extended, however,
to multiple banks.
The assumption of unit-sized households arises from the following considerations. First,
with heterogeneous house sizes, matching buyers and sellers becomes more complicated and
computationally intensive. Matching houses and households along two dimensions, budget
and size, tends to make the housing market less efficient, resulting in fewer transactions for
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a given number of houses and households. In order to obtain the same market liquidity as
measured by transaction volume, a larger number of houses and households would be needed.
Since the purpose of our model is not to examine market frictions and search and matching
costs, we deem it acceptable to simplify the framework to unit size houses. Second, if house
sizes and thus also house prices follow a nondegenerate distribution, the functioning of the
housing market in the model depends on a proper match between the house price distribution
and the distribution of household budgets. Changes in the regulatory environment can lead
to sudden shifts in either of these two distributions. The resulting mismatch between the
two distributions in the transition period can lead to a collapse of the model and thus limits
the range of policy regime changes that can be examined with this model. For example,
imagine that an increase in the loan-to-value ratio can shift the distribution of buyer’s budgets
suddenly upwards. If previously the budget distribution was roughly congruent with the price
distribution, now we have high income households that cannot find a house in their price
range, and small houses that are unattractive even for their previous low-income buyers. This
necessitates further model features to adjust for the mismatch. While we can imagine that in
the real world this collapse does not occur due to for example sufficiently adaptive agents,
the limited scope of our model calls for simplification, and we have omitted this feature. Our
model can thus be thought as representing a sufficiently homogeneous sector of the overall
housing market.
The assumption of infinitely lived houses also arises from our intention to reduce the
complexity of the model. If houses had a finite lifespan, this feature would have to be reflected
in the valuation of houses. All else equal, houses with a residual lifespan of only a few
periods would be expected to be less valuable than newly built houses that are expected to last
many more periods. In earlier iterations of the model we accounted for this by representing
the house price via a discounted cashflow model along the lines of Kajuth et al. (2013). While
this can be made to work, it introduces an additional layer of complexity into the model
without providing any additional explanatory power for our purpose. We thus simplified the
model in later iterations and replaced the finite lifespan of houses with a simple stochastic
mechanism. Each period, each house is destructed with a small but fixed probability pdestruct .
While this provides a need for construction in order to maintain the housing stock, it relieves
us from the necessity of lifespan-dependent valuations. In small-scale simulations, the model
behavior did not change significantly due to this simplification.
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Another simplification we implemented in the model regards the household budgeting.
We keep the cash position of each household constant over time. In the real world, the
repayment of mortgages increases the equity of households, which, in case of a transaction,
becomes available as cash. The stock of cash is thus experiencing exponential growth,
rendering the model nonstationary. We examined several options during model development
in order to cope with this. First, we can accept it as a feature of real-world housing markets
and restrict ourselves to studying the detrended model results where appropriate. Second,
we can introduce model features that depreciate the value of housing to the extent that it
compensates for the growth in equity induced by mortgage repayments, for example by
means of maintenance costs. This would yield a potentially stationary but more complex
model. Third, we can allow ourselves to relax the household budget calculation by assuming
a constant cash position. This solution unites both advantages, and we arrive at a simpler
model that still is potentially stationary. Since the cash position is only relevant at the time of
a house purchase, one possible interpretation is that new buyers always come from outside the
model, drawn from a stable income and cash distribution. Again, several options were tested
in a small-scale version of the model, and this simplification did not induce any significant
change in the results.
The simulation runs for tmax periods. Each period t, the following steps are executed.
Households that have been homeless for more than tmh periods are removed from the simu-
lations. This simulates households that have grown frustrated with the long search for an
affordable house and leave the market. In order to keep the overall number of households
constant, leaving households are one by one replaced with new households. The aggregate
income of the newcomers is equal to the aggregate income of the quitters in order to keep the
total income in the model constant.2
Next, household incomes are updated. They follow a mean-reverting process that keeps
the aggregate income constant. First, each household’s income i(t−1) is updated to i∗(t)
by a mean-reverting shock as shown in equation 4.1 with mean reversion parameter α . The
innovations εi(t) are i.i.d normally distributed, εi(t)∼ N(µi,σi).
2Again, this is a simplification. A more realistic alternative would be to have a constant influx of new
households looking for a house, and having this influx reach an equilibrium with the number of households that
quit. However, in this setting it is less obvious how to keep aggregate income constant.
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i∗i (t) = ii(t−1)+α · (ii(0)− ii(t))+ ii(t−1) · εi(t) (4.1)
Second, in order to keep the aggregate income constant, each household’s income i∗i (t) is
adjusted by the normalization factor ν = ∑ j i j(t−1)∑ j i∗j(t) as shown in equation 4.2. If the shocks
increased the aggregate income, i.e. if the mean shock was larger than zero, ν will be smaller
than one, thus decreasing each household income so that the sum of incomes is the same as
last period. If the mean shock was smaller than zero, ν will be larger than one, and household
incomes are increased, again to ensure that the sum of incomes stays the same as last period.
ii(t) = i∗i (t) ·ν (4.2)
With a fixed probability pmove, each household that currently owns a house is moving
within the city, thus putting its house on the market.3 Now, households check whether they
are default. This can happen for two reasons. First, due to the income shocks they just
received, household’s residual income, i.e. income minus mortgage payment, may fall below
a certain absolute minimum income i. This reflects the minimum residual income that is
needed to cover the per-period costs of living. If households cannot cover these costs, they
default on their mortgage. Second, households may default if the market value of their
house is lower than the outstanding mortgage, resulting in negative equity. In both cases,
households are removed from the model, and their houses are put on the market. Also the
construction projects that were initialized lc periods ago are now finished and put on the
market as well.
The price of houses that are newly available for sale is set at a constant markup m over
last period’s average transaction price p(t−1),
paskk (t) = (1+m) · p(t−1). (4.3)
3In earlier iterations of the model and in analogy to Barras (2005), households would move only if their
income change put their preferred debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratio outside a prespecified band, such as
[.2; .4]. That approach, however, required a very careful calibration of the parameters of the mean-reverting
income processes in order to arrive at a somewhat stable number of movers and thus a stable housing market
without adding any explanatory power.
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Now, all households that are looking for a house - we denote them as active - calculate
their budget. Household budgets bi(t) consist of the cash ci and loan assurances from banks
as equation 4.4 shows.
bi(t) = ci+ lmaxi (t) (4.4)
The maximum loan households can obtain is the smaller of the maximum loan under the
LTV constraint and the maximum loan under the DSTI constraint,
lmaxi (t) = min
(
lLTVi (t), l
DST I
i (t)
)
. (4.5)
The maximum loan under the LTV constraint is calculated as follows. From the budget
equation 4.4 and the definition of the maximum LTV as the ratio of loan and price,
LTV :=
li(t)
paskk (t)
, (4.6)
we can derive the following relation between the cash position ci(t) and the maximum
loan for a given LTV:
lLTVi (t) = ci ·
LTV
1−LTV . (4.7)
The second restriction is the maximum debt service to income (DSTI) ratio of households.
This can be thought of either as a restriction on the side of households, i.e. they prefer to pay
at most s = α · ii(t), α ∈ [0,1] in monthly payments, where α is the affordability parameter.
Alternatively, this can also be viewed as a regulatory constraint requiring banks to limit debt
service to a maximum proportion of the debtor’s income. For a loan with nominal amount l,
duration Tm and per-period interest rate r, the size of the per-period payment for each period
t = 1...T can be calculated as
s = l · (1+ r)
Tm
∑Tm−1τ=0 (1+ r)τ
. (4.8)
From this, we can solve for the maximal nominal l given a payment s as
l = s · ∑
Tm−1
τ=0 (1+ r)
τ
(1+ r)Tm
. (4.9)
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Restricting the DSTI ratio to α amounts to setting s = α · ii(t), and we obtain a second
upper bound for the loan as
lDST Ii (t) = α · ii(t) ·
∑Tm−1τ=0 (1+ r)
τ
(1+ r)Tm
(4.10)
Combining the two, the maximum loan available to household i is given by equation 4.5,
and the budget by equation 4.4.
With houses for sale and potential buyers fully specified, the market works as follows.
For each house that is for sale, we first determine the set of suitable buyers. For a given house
k, a household most fulfill three conditions to be considered suitable. First, it must be active,
i.e. currently looking for a house to buy. Second, its budget bi(t) must be larger than the
asking price of the house, bi(t)≥ pk(t). Third, the asking price of the house must be equal
to or greater than a fixed fraction of the household’s budget, pk(t)≥ fi ·bi(t). This reflects
the preference of households to employ as much of their budget as possible. If there is more
than one household that fulfill all three conditions, the buyer is chosen at random, and the
house is transacted to its new owner. The new owner takes out the maximal admissible loan
and pays for the rest with cash. This maximal admissible, or final, loan is calculated as
l f inali (t) = min(l
max
i (t), pk(t) ·LTV ) (4.11)
The first term in the brackets is known from equation 4.5 and reflects the binding
constraint. The second term reflects the fact that if the LTV is binding, the maximal admissible
loan may be less than the theoretically maximal loan in equation 4.7. The reason is that the
maximal loan in equation 4.7 was calculated indirectly, from the cash position. This implicitly
assumes that the household buys a house at a price equal to its total budget. If the actual
price is smaller than the household budget, i.e. if the denominator in the Loan-To-Value is
smaller, the same loan would result in a higher realized LTV.
Let us clarify this last point with a small numerical example for better understanding.
Imagine that the LTV is at 50% and binding. For a household with a cash position of 1.0, this
results in a theoretically maximal loan of 1.0 and a budget of 2.0. If this household acquires
a house at the price of 1.8, it cannot take the full loan promise made by the bank. The reason
is that at a price of 1.8, a loan of 1.0 would result in a realized LTV of 1.0/1.8 = 55.6%.
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This violates the maximum LTV constraint of 50%. Instead, at a transaction price of 1.8 and
an LTV of 50%, the household can take out a loan only of 0.9.
Bank loans are kept in a single portfolio. This allows us to track credit volume as well as
return on the credit portfolio over time. We refrain from modeling banks in more detail at
this point due to bank level heterogeneity (Buch and Goldberg 2016).
The average price of all successful transactions p(t) is recorded as reference price for
next period’s new offers. The prices of unsold houses are decreased by a fixed fraction dr,
paskk (t+1) = (1−dr) · paskk (t). (4.12)
Houses are destructed if their ask price falls below a certain fraction fpmin of this average
transaction price,
paskk (t+1)< fpmin · p(t). (4.13)
In a last step, we update construction. The process of constructing new houses is assumed
to take lc periods until the houses are completed and can be put on the market. In line with
previous literature (Krainer 2002), we assume that the level of new construction activity C(t)
is linear in the expected price level at the time the construction is finished:
C(t) = α0+α1Et [p(t+ lc)]. (4.14)
Expectations are formed by simple extrapolation from current price level and the average
price change over the past lp periods:
Et [p(t+ lc)] = p(t)+
lc
lp
lp
∑
τ=1
·(p(t− τ+1)− p(t− τ)) (4.15)
Thus, at time t+ lc, C(t) new houses will be put on the market. Table 4.1 provides the default
values for all parameters of our model.
4.3 Model Structure 88
parameter description value
n0h initial number of houses 2000
n0hh initial number of households 3000
i lower bound income distribution 500
sΓ shape parameter income distribution 1.3
rΓ rate parameter income distribution 0.001
αi mean reversion household income 0.2
µi mean shock household income 0.0
σi standard deviation household income .15
pmove probability for household to move 0.02
pdestruct probability for houses to be destructed 0.005
m mark-up for house sale 0.02
dr mark-down for unsold houses 0.01
lc construction lag 12
lp lookback period for price expectation 12
fpmin fraction minimum house price 0.8
r interest rate on mortgages 0.03/12
Tm mortgage duration 15 ·12
LTV0 loan-to-value ratio 0.7
α0 debt-service-to-income ratio 0.3
Table 4.1 Model baseline parameters.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Illustration of model dynamics
In this section we illustrate the temporal evolution of the major model variables and the
reaction of the model to changes of the policy parameters. When examining policy changes,
our model runs over four phases. The first one is used to allow the model to settle into a
statistical equilibrium. Here, we use a burn-in period of 2000 simulation steps. The second
phase of another 1000 time steps is used to collect the pre-change statistics. Policy changes
are then executed over a transition period of 100 periods during which the chosen policy
parameter changes linearly from its old to its new value. Afterwards, the model runs for
another 1000 periods which allows us to collect the post-change statistics.
Figure 4.1 shows an example of the temporal evolution of our simulated housing market.
In this case, the maximal LTV changes at t = 3000 from LTVlo = 0.5 to LTVhi = 0.9 during
the transition period, indicated by the vertical dotted lines in the graphs. The first 1000
periods in the graphs show that the model has settled into a statistical equilibrium. All
variables fluctuate within narrow ranges. The policy change over the periods 3000-3100
impacts nearly all variables of interest in the model. Figure 4.1a shows the average transaction
price and the range of transaction prices. We see that in line with expectations the transaction
price level increases as a reaction to the policy change. In the post-change period, the average
transaction price is 9.2% higher than in the pre-change period. The increase in the average
price level is accompanied by an increase in volatility, with the standard deviation increasing
from 1.5% to 2.5%. The shaded area shows the range spanned by minimal and maximal
transaction price in each period. It stays roughly the same at 6% of the average transaction
price. The figure shows also the quasi-periodic nature of transaction prices, which seems to
be more pronounced at higher LTV levels. Figure 4.1b shows evolution of the housing stock.
The construction sector reacts to the increase in transaction prices by increasing the supply
of housing. In comparison to the price level, the housing stock takes a much longer time to
settle into a new equilibrium.
Since defaults in the model are very rare, Figure 4.1c shows the aggregate number of
defaults in a moving 100 period window. While the model offers the possibility of both
strategic defaults and defaults due to adverse income shocks, only the latter materialize in
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this simulation. With an increase in the LTV, this number begins to rise as well. Figure 4.1d
shows the impact of the policy change on the binding credit constraints of house buyers. We
would expect that if the LTV constraint is loosened, less households experience it as the
binding constraint in their application for a loan. This intuition is confirmed by the simulation:
With the increase in the maximum LTV ratio, the proportion of new loans for which the LTV
is the binding constraint - we call it “LTV ratio” for short - decreases from 73% to 33%.
Figure 4.1e shows the impact on the size of the loan portfolio of banks. First, we see that the
portfolio increases by almost 50%. This is a combined effect of higher mortgages on already
existing houses and a larger overall number of houses and thus mortgages due to increased
construction. Figure 4.1f demonstrates the effect on per-period bank profits. For the most
part, profits remain at the level of interest rates. The downward spikes that occur in irregular
intervals are defaults of individual households. Their seemingly pronounced impact on bank
profits in this graphic has two reasons. First, the impact of an individual loan on the profit of
the portfolio decreases with the number of loans in the sample. Since the number of agents
and thus loans in this simulation is limited and thus portfolio concentration is relatively high,
each household has significant impact on the performance of the portfolio. Second, the graph
depicts the per-period profit. With periods roughly modeled as months, aggregating them
into quarterly or annual numbers would smooth out the spikes considerably. In analogy to
figure 4.1c, figure 4.1f shows the increase in the number of defaults as an increase in the
number of negative spikes. Still, the effect on average profit is negligible. Compared to the
pre-change period, the slightly increased number of defaults reduces the profit only by 1%.
4.4.2 Exploration of policy parameter space
In order to get an idea of the overall behavior of the model under different policy settings,
we simulated the model for a three-dimensional grid spanned by the policy parameters LTV,
DSTI and interest rate. Table 4.2 shows the policy parameter ranges that we explored. Overall,
this approach resulted in nearly 2000 simulations. Here we present the most interesting
findings.
Each of the following heat maps shows the average value of one model variable. We keep
one policy parameter fixed, and the remaining two parameters vary along the axes of the heat
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(a) transaction price. (b) number of houses and households.
(c) number of defaults. (d) share ltv binds.
(e) bank assets. (f) bank profits.
Fig. 4.1 Reaction of the model to an increase in the LTV.
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parameter min max steps
maximum LTV 0.5 0.9 11
maximum DSTI 0.2 0.6 11
interest rate 0.01/12 0.08/12 15
Table 4.2 Policy parameter ranges.
map. Similar to before, all statistics were computed from 1000 periods after a burn-in period
of length 2000.
Figure 4.2a shows the average transaction price along DSTI and interest rate for an LTV
of 0.9. The heat map shows that the interest rate has hardly any influence on the average
transaction price level. Similarly, in figure 4.2b, we can see that the share of new loans for
which the LTV is the binding constraint depends only moderately on the interest rate. The
reason for this is that with the given parameters, the DSTI loan constraint in equation 4.10 is
far more sensitive to changes in the DSTI than to changes in the interest rate. However, the
interest rate does have an impact on the number of transactions as well as on the number of
defaults, as figures 4.3a and 4.3b show.
The number of defaults increases in both DSTI and interest rates. As before, all defaults
are due to household income falling below the minimum household income needed for
survival. Higher DSTIs allow households to have a smaller buffer of income above the
residual income, thus increasing the probability that a series of negative income shocks
drives them into insolvency. Higher interest rates ceteris paribus also increase the monthly
payment, thus having a similar effect on the default probability. The average number of
transactions also reacts to both interest rate and DSTIs. Both higher DSTIs and lower interest
rates potentially increase the maximum loans that households can obtain. While this may
mean for some high-income households that their budget increases to a point where they
are no longer classified as suitable buyers, the larger number of low-income households that
can now afford a house leads to an overall increase in potential buyers. Consequently, the
number of transactions increases.
On the bank side, figure 4.4 shows the pronounced difference between a low and a high
LTV environment. Figure 4.4a shows that for an LTV of 0.5, the DSTI plays hardly any
role for the volume of the loan portfolio. The reason is that the low LTV acts as the binding
constraint for the majority of new loans, effectively rendering the DSTI unimportant. The
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(a) average transaction price (b) share of new loans bound by LTV
Fig. 4.2 Average prices and binding credit constraints, LTV=0.9
17% increase in total loans along the interest rate dimension only reflects larger payments
on loans that have otherwise the same nominal size. With a high LTV of 90%, the picture
changes completely, as figure 4.4b shows. Now, going from a low DSTI of 0.2 to a high
DSTI of 0.6 triples the amount of total loans, thus having a far bigger effect than the interest
rate effect discussed above. Not surprisingly, this difference is not visible in bank profits in
figure 4.5 which depend almost exclusively on the interest rate.
(a) number of defaults (b) number of transactions
Fig. 4.3 Defaults and market liquidity, LTV=0.9
Keeping the maximum DSTI ratio fixed, figure 4.6 shows that the LTV has a far stronger
impact on the price level than interest rates, regardless of the level of the DSTI ratio. However,
for a both high and low DSTIs, price sensitivity towards LTVs increases with the level of
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(a) LTV = 0.5 (b) LTV = 0.9
Fig. 4.4 Loans, total volume
(a) LTV = 0.5 (b) LTV = 0.9
Fig. 4.5 Return on loan portfolio
LTVs. In the low DSTI environment in figure 4.6a the interest rate still has a clearly negative
effect on the price level. For high DSTIs, there is no systematic relation between interest
rates and price levels. The number of defaults exhibits a similar behavior relative to LTVs,
only increasing significantly for LTVs larger than 0.7 in a low DSTI setting and for LTVs
exceeding 0.8 in a high DSTI setting.
Figure 4.8 shows the share of new loans constrained by LTV. For low DSTIs, the shift
towards DSTI binding occurs already for moderately high LTVS. The share of loans bound
by LTVs decreases all the way down to around 20% for high LTVs. In contrast, in a high
DSTI setting, only very few households experience the DSTI binding, even for very high
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LTVs. The total amount of loans outstanding is highly sensitive to the LTV for both high and
low DSTI settings, reflecting binding character of the LTV constraint. Still, in the high DSTI
setting the total loans span a broader range than in the low DSTI setting.
(a) DSTI = 0.2 (b) DSTI = 0.6
Fig. 4.6 Average transaction price
(a) DSTI = 0.2 (b) DSTI = 0.6
Fig. 4.7 Number of defaults
Figure 4.10 shows the average transaction prices for fixed interest rates. At low rates,
the price level is insensitive to DSTI and LTV levels unless both parameters are chosen to
be at the upper end of their respective range. For high interest rates, however, the DSTI
becomes the primary determinant of the average price level. Counter-intuitively, however,
the price level decreases by ca. 17% for an increase in the DSTI from 0.2 to 0.6. This
can be considered an artifact of this particular model. Low DSTIs imply more restrictive
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(a) DSTI = 0.2 (b) DSTI = 0.6
Fig. 4.8 Share of loans bound by LTV
(a) DSTI = 0.2 (b) DSTI = 0.6
Fig. 4.9 Loans, total volume
budget constraints. This translates into fewer buyers that might drive the price up. Since
construction is proportional to extrapolated changes in house prices, construction decreases
as a consequence. On a first look, this should increase the house price level due to a decrease
in supply. There is, however, a second effect. The volatility of average transaction prices
decreases with a higher DSTI. Due to the lower volatility of the house prices at high DSTIs,
the band of house prices covers a smaller part of the support of the budget distribution.
Thus, lower price volatility means that the market is suited for fewer buyers. During our
experiments, the average time houses were on the market roughly doubled from 5 to 10
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periods. According to equation 4.12, this depressed house prices. Figure 4.11 shows that the
loan portfolio develops similarly to the average transaction prices.
Figure 4.12 shows that in a low-interest environment, defaults only arise in the case of
very high LTVs. For high interest rates, the number of defaults is overall much lower, and
it is mainly dependent on the DSTI. Throughout the simulation, all defaults were due to
household incomes breaching the lower bound, and no strategic defaults could be observed.
(a) r = 0.01 (b) r = 0.08
Fig. 4.10 Average transaction price
(a) r = 0.01 (b) r = 0.08
Fig. 4.11 Size of loan portfolio.
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(a) r = 0.01 (b) r = 0.08
Fig. 4.12 Number of defaults
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper we provided a simple agent-based model of the housing market. Our agents, in
particular house buyers and the construction sector, make use of simple heuristics as they can
be found in the literature. Our model exhibits a wide range of dynamics. In particular, we
demonstrated the challenge to examine the effectiveness of individual macroprudential mea-
sures in isolation. In all our simulations, the impact of one individual policy parameter was
highly dependent on the other policy parameters. This paper complements empirical research
on the effectiveness of macroprudential measures and the interaction of macroprudential and
monetary policy.
In most simulations, the impact of the level of the interest rate on model outcomes was
smaller than the impact of the macroprudential policy parameters. Especially with regard to
average transaction price levels and to the number of defaults, the macroprudential policy
parameters turned out to be the main influence. This supports the fundamental argument for
macroprudential policy discussed in section 4.2. At the same time, our model has successfully
demonstrated that the effectiveness of individual policy parameters is difficult to evaluate
in isolation. In particular, the effect of a low DSTI ratio versus a high DSTI ratio depended
strongly on the maximum LTV ratio. In a high LTV setting, a low DSTI becomes the main
budget constraint, whereas in a low LTV setting the DSTI ratio at times has hardly any impact
at all. Of course, the same holds for the impact of the LTV.
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The model can be extended in various directions. First, an increase the number of agents
may move the model closer to reality. At the time of this writing, the first agent-based models
emerge in the literature that model full-scale economies. For example, Axtell (2016) provides
a model of the US economy with 120 million agents. Moving towards full scale removes one
potential drawback of agent-based models, and that is n-dependence. This is the observation
that even if the behavioral rules of agents are not changed, the model outcome may depend
on the number of agents. For examples and discussions of this problem, see Alfarano and
Milakovic´ (2009) and Alfarano et al. (2005).
Second, our model abstracted from a number of features that can be found in real-world
housing markets. As an example, a few models in the literature have developed intricate
algorithms of mortgage negotiation, market clearing and default resolution that could be
integrated. As we discussed in section 4.3, each new feature adds complexity to the model
and makes it harder to track causality. Thus, each extension demands a discussion of its
benefits in order to properly weigh detail against tractability. Third, banks have so far
been represented only as passive actors in the form of a loan portfolio. Implicit in this
representation were the assumptions that (a) banks do not restrict credit supply and (b) banks
set their credit requirements automatically to the maximum allowed by the regulator. Both
aspects deserve further attention in an extended model with endogenous bank behavior.
Combining the last two points, it is noteworthy that in real-world banks, accounting rules
may allow for a significant lag between household insolvency and the recognition of default
on the bank side. This may add yet another explanatory factor for housing market dynamics.
Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
The research presented here contributes to the economic literature in at first seemingly
unrelated areas. The common denominator is the disaggregate, bottom-up perspective on
economic and financial systems. In the first contribution in chapter 2, we extended an existing
model of static interbank networks to more realistic core-periphery structures. We found
that while some overall tendencies of system stability translate from the benchmark random
network case to the core-periphery setting, some new insights can be gained. In particular,
within the logic of the model, the low periphery density severely limits the capability of
the system to absorb shocks. Moreover, we analyzed the accuracy of a meanfield approach
relative to the full simulation results. While this provided good approximations to the full-
scale simulation in early rounds, its performance in later rounds deteriorated. We found that
this shortcoming is rooted in the initial bank heterogeneity. It should further be noted that the
shock transmission behavior in this model was highly stylized. Thus, further research into
actual bank behavior especially in situations of distress is needed. Once reliable empirical
insights have been obtained, it would be interesting to come back to the theoretical setting in
order to examine the effect of this increased complexity on the agent level.
The second paper contributes to the empirical knowledge base of the structure of real-
world economic systems. We provided a statistical analysis of the topology of the bipartite
network of credit exposures between Spanish banks and firms. Our results showed that the
linking structure found in the empirical data exhibits significant differences to those found
in their simulated pendants. As a secondary goal, the use of multiple measures of bipartite
clustering enabled us to compare their relative performance. These showed interesting
101
variations. While some measures successfully detected the difference between the empirical
networks and their randomly linked counterparts, other measures were better suited to extract
the subtle temporal trend that was present in the empirical data. Together with the short
methodological discussion on the transfer of the clustering concept from unipartite to bipartite
networks, it is clear that future research is needed in both directions. On the economic side,
the reason for the nonrandom structure deserves further attention. It will be interesting
to isolate the reasons for this nonrandomness in a richer dataset. Then we will be able to
provide this particular behavior with an economic interpretation as opposed to the primarily
network-theoretic interpretation we were able to give in this paper. Moreover, the impact of
these particular topologies on economic dynamics and stability deserves further attention.
On the network theoretic side, our research contributed to the debate on bipartite network
statistics. The mixed results clearly demonstrate the need for further investigation.
Our last paper provided a simple agent-based model of the housing market. It served
to demonstrate the interactions between monetary and macroprudential policy and their
joint impact on the dynamics of the housing market. We found that the effectiveness of
individual macroprudential measures varies significantly based on the policy environment
where they are set. At the time of writing, despite the confidence that can be found in most
publications by regulators and policy makers, the gap between knowledge based on theory
and models on the one hand and the regulatory practice on the other hand is still rather large.
The former often suffer from a lack of microlevel data and have thus to fall back on intuition
and uninformed assumptions, especially regarding the behavior of financial institutions The
latter is still often guided by rules of thumbs, case-by-case considerations and political and
institutional constraints. Our paper is one of many puzzle pieces that contribute to the intense
discussion and ultimately to the convergence of these two strands.
For a final remark, I would like to zoom out from the particular research in the preceding
chapters. It is refreshing to see that the number of economists who ask critical questions
regarding the status quo of economic methodology is rising. To the author, the bottom-up
formulation has appeared as a promising perspective on economic and financial systems
for years. Beyond all the technical arguments that we have reviewed in the beginning
and that shine through at a few places throughout this thesis, it is quite simply the most
natural mapping from a world that we observe daily as consisting of many different agents
who interact locally, into models that aim to make sense and to explain the causes and
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consequences of these interactions. From that viewpoint, this thesis has been a valuable
exercise in operationalizing this approach. Reflecting on the biggest challenges this strand of
research faces, the author was able to observe two promising trends during his work. First,
the knowledge base regarding the internal structure of the economic and financial system is
constantly growing. This will provide invaluable orientation for the design and evaluation
of agent-based models in the future. Second, there is growing awareness that the diverse
literature of computational agent-based models needs to be consolidated. One of the biggest
drawbacks of the agent-based approach is the lack of a canonical model. Arriving at least at
a partial a consensus and maybe even at a set of benchmark models will greatly improve the
stance of this type of thinking in the economic discipline.
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Simulation results for bipartite networks
A.1 Simulation results, year=2000
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Fig. A.2 Random networks, year=2000: 1-degree and 2-degree, firms.
Fig. A.3 Random networks, year=2000: minclustering, banks.
A.1 Simulation results, year=2000 114
Fig. A.4 Random networks, year=2000: max clustering, banks.
Fig. A.5 Random networks, year=2000: redundancy, banks.
A.1 Simulation results, year=2000 115
Fig. A.6 Random networks, year=2000: degree distribution of projections,
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Fig. A.7 Random networks, year=2000: clustering in projections, banks.
A.2 Simulation results, year=2001 116
A.2 Simulation results, year=2001
Fig. A.8 Random networks, year=2001: 1-degree and 2-degree, banks.
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Fig. A.10 Random networks, year=2001: min clustering, banks.
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Fig. A.12 Random networks, year=2001: redundancy, banks.
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A.3 Simulation results, year=2002 119
Fig. A.14 Random networks, year=2001: clustering in projections, banks.
A.3 Simulation results, year=2002
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Fig. A.16 Random networks, year=2002: 1-degree and 2-degree, firms.
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Fig. A.28 Random networks, year=2003: clustering in projections, banks.
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Fig. A.32 Random networks, year=2004: max clustering, banks.
Fig. A.33 Random networks, year=2004: redundancy, banks.
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Fig. A.34 Random networks, year=2004: degree distribution of projec-
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Fig. A.44 Random networks, year=2006: 1-degree and 2-degree, firms.
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Fig. A.46 Random networks, year=2006: max clustering, banks.
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Fig. A.48 Random networks, year=2006: degree distribution of projec-
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A.8 Simulation results, year=2007
Fig. A.50 Random networks, year=2007: 1-degree and 2-degree, banks.
Fig. A.51 Random networks, year=2007: 1-degree and 2-degree, firms.
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Fig. A.52 Random networks, year=2007: min clustering, banks.
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Fig. A.54 Random networks, year=2007: redundancy, banks.
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Fig. A.56 Random networks, year=2007: clustering in projections, banks.
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